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Information Technology and Social Changes

Jongwoo Han

 

There are three different views on the impacts of the current information technology revolution upon society, economy, politics, and culture: the Continuists’, the Transformists’, and the Structuralists’. The Continuist School (Schement and Lievrouw, 1987; Schiller, 1983, 1984; Robins and Webster 1988; Hepworth and Robins, 1988) argues that information technology, despite its wide applications in economy and society, has not affected the very foundation of the socio-economic structure. It acknowledges IT’s contribution to productivity increases in industry. However, it denounces the actual impacts of IT as a tool of industrialists who aptly deploy IT for the maintenance and consolidation of their power over labor. Transformists (Machlup, 1962; Bell, 1973, 1980; Martin, 1981; Williams, 1982; Naisbitt, 1984; Dizard, 1984; Forester, 1987) view the current challenge as a revolution following the agricultural and the industrial ones. It is not clear whether they see the information technology revolution as resulting in all-pervasive and far-reaching changes to civilization or not. However, they point out that the IT development speed is fast and pervasive enough to bring forth a fundamental leap forward in everyday life. Structuralists (Mattelart, 1979; Mosco and Hermann, 1981, Castells, 1996) generally take the view of Continuists but differ from the Transformist in their view that it will take more time to witness the eventual changes brought about by information technology in our life

 

Despite such divergent assessments on the ongoing changes brought about by information technology, many agree that rapid development in information technology has a tremendous effect in restructuring economy and industry. The main focus of social scientists is on how information technology affects the socio-political system and to what extent this effects have proceeded The debates on the impacts of information technology upon the socio-political system ought to wait for more convincing and structural evidence to support opposing arguments. This article takes Structuralists view and finds that the Internet, as a direct outcome of information technology development, plays a significant catalytic role in the socio-political system in Korea. The recent twenty-year period in Korean society has demonstrated that the Internet, when combined with human networks, can be an explosive tool in both the political and social context. In the 2000 Korean general election, highlighted by world news media, the ‘Defeat Movement’, proved the power of information technology in political campaign and election processes as well as in political party structure. This unprecedented event traumatized the conventional political system and existing power groups but was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The Internet-based negative campaign was launched by citizen alliances and the result was reflected as an earthquake-like reshuffling in the seats of the National Assembly. Another good example can be found in the recent 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup championship. Soccer fans of the world were amazed not only by the successful operations of the competition co-hosted by two countries but also by the Red Devils, the fans of Korea’s team, that filled the streets.

 

These two revolutionary examples share two important facts. First of all, these two seemingly discreet socio-political phenomena would have not been possible without the rapid and wide application of information technology. More specifically, such socio-political changes were ignited by the technical networks mediated by the byproduct of the information technology revolution, the Internet. Second, they were possible due to the density of human networks established prior to the advent of the advanced use of information technology. These two events establish an equation that information technology is relationship technology. Conclusively, the human density accumulated in diverse environments of Korean society was successfully combined by the connectivity provided by Internet. This article shows how these two elements, technology and human social capital, can produce synergic effects and result in the structural changes in socio-political system. These cases prove the explosive potential of the network effect observed by Robert Metcalf, Metcalf’s Law[1]. The social network theory, that human networks can be measured by two variables, density and distance among human resources.

In this article, these Korean cases aptly demonstrate that the analytical tool of this theory can be successfully applied. “Bates (1984)[2] pointed out that any information society is a complex web consisting not only of a technological infrastructure, but also an economic structure, a pattern of social relations, organizational patterns, and perhaps other facets of social organizations.” The social capital formed prior to the era of Internet is the density as distance can be narrowed down by the Internet connectivity. Korean people with characteristics of being gregarious, hyper-socialized, and group-oriented reduced the physical distance among themselves by means of PC Cafés woven together by Internet.

 

This article argues that among the factors affecting the process of informatization, social capital is one of the most critical dimensions to consider. Technology alone cannot explain such a dynamic picture of Korea’s informatization. “Technology always takes place in a social matrix and interacts with society. (Kranzberg, 1985:37)” This article specifically addresses the factors contributing to the dynamic application of IT and its impacts upon society. It was a perfect combination of rapid diffusion of Internet in society and the newly grown civic organization that revolutionized the political campaign and election in 2000.

 

Korea and Informatization: Explosive Usage of the Internet

Korea’s Informatization effort, reforming and reinventing the public and private sectors with information technology, has been speedy enough to attract world attention mainly because government initiative was very effective and strong. However, in overall rankings of the Informatization index[3] among 50 countries, it is not as impressive as the two cases above. According to the White Paper of the National Computerization Agency of Korea based on the data released by the International Telecommunications Union, Korea has ranked in the middle group among 50 nations. From 1995 to 1998, Korea was 21st, 19th in 1999, and 17th in 2000. Changes in its somewhat progressive but not top-ranking Informatization index do not literally explain the two phenomenal social events introduced above. The overall level of information technology development and infrastructure do not definitely place Korean society and people in the context of such active use of IT by people.

 

However, careful study on Korea’s Informatization would reveal very interesting statistical facts, differentiating Korea from other leading countries in Informatization. The first relates to increasing rates in the overall index. As in Table 1, the growth rate in personal computer use, mobile phone subscriptions, Internet usage and provider capacity has been dramatically increased. Especially, the increases in the total number of Internet users, hosts, and ISPs in Korea has been substantial in the last four years. The Korean government directed its central focus on the expansion of Internet infrastructure and its actual usage by people. Without incredible growth in Internet infrastructure, capabilities, and in actual usage, neither the phenomenon of the ‘Defeat Movement’ in 2000 nor that of the ‘Red Devils’ would have been realizable.

 

[Table 1] Indicators of ICT infrastructure

 

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Annual Growth

PCs owned per 100 persons

15.0

17.8

24.6

 

 

29.4

Mobile phone subscribers per 100 persons

15.0

30.2

50.0

55.2

 

59.1

Internet users aged 7 years and over per 100 persons

4.0

7.5

25.9

45.0

52.0

136.2

Internet hosts per 1,000 persons

2.8

4.4

9.8

10.2

 

60.9

ISPs (unit)

23

25

54

83

89

59.5

Source:   1) http://stat.nic.or.kr for data on Internet (Korean Network Information Center, 2001)

               2) National informatization White Paper and Informatization Statistics Yearbook for data on the

                   number of PCs and mobile phone subscribers (National Computerization Agency, 2001)

               3) Population Projection for data on population (KNSO, 1996)

 

Table 2 supports this argument. The hours spent on PC communication and Internet per week has almost tripled in July 2000 compared to that of three years before, April 1997. Also, computer ownership is equated with the Internet by showing the main purpose of having one in year 2000 to be 5 times that of 1997.

 

[Table 2] ICT access and opportunity of individuals and households

 

Proportions of households with computers (%)

PC literacy rate of aged 6 years and more (%)

Hours spent on computer use per week (hours)

Individuals whose purpose of computer use is PC comm. & Internet (%)

Hours spent on PC comm.& Internet per week

April 1997

29.0

39.9

5.9

7.9

4.2

July 2000

46.4

51.6

17.2

40.4

10.4

Increase

17.4%

11.7%

11.3 hrs

32.5%

6.2 hrs

Source: 2000 Social Statistical Survey (KNSO, 2001)

 

              A more interesting finding lies in the population composition of the computer and Internet generations in Korea. The current population of Korea is 47,639,618. That number by age gives another picture when considered in the context of Internet users and literacy. As in Table 3, Population by Age, population in the range of five to nineteen is 10,150,888, twenties 8,061,785, thirties 8,564,652, forties 7,598,827, and fifties 4,534,603. Each age-range counts for 21.3, 16.9, 18, 16, and 9.5 percent of the total population, respectively. Those who are very active in Internet use fall into in the age group from students in elementary school to forties and they count for 72.2 percent of the total population.[4]

 

[Table 3]  Population in Korea by Age

Age Range

Total

Percent

Accumulative Percentage

0-4

3,048,362

6.4%

6.4%

5-19

10,150,888

21.3%

27.6%

20s

8,061,785

16.9%

44.6%

30s

8,564,652

18%

62.6%

40s

7,598,827

16%

78.6%

50s

4,534,603

9.5%

88.1%

Over 60s

5,680,501

12%

100.1%

Source: Korean National Statistical Office, numbers current

 

In fact, the numbers of Internet users are heavily concentrated in the range from age seven, the age of an entering elementary school student, to nineteen, the age of a high school senior. According to Table 4, the penetration rate of frequent Internet user, the Netizen from age 7 to 30s in 1999 was 31.3 percent, 64.1 in 2000, and 79.8 in 2001. By December of 2001, based on the two statistical data above, Koreans in the age from 7 to 40s, approximately 70 percent of the total population, counts for round 69 percent of the total Internet users.

 

[Table 4]  Internet Penetration Rate in Korea by Age (%)

Age Range

Time

7-19

20s

30s

40s

50s

Oct. ‘99

33.6

41.9

18.5

12.8

2.9

Mar. ‘00

51.5

59.1

29.2

8.6

3.3

Aug. ‘00

65.9

65.9

35.4

18.5

4.3

Dec. ‘00

74.1

74.6

43.6

22.7

5.7

Mar. ‘01

81.6

78.4

48.4

29

6.3

Jun. ‘01

87.6

80.3

54.1

32.2

7.3

Sep. ‘01

91.1

84

61.3

36.6

8.3

Dec. ‘01

93.3

84.6

61.6

35.6

8.7

Source: Korea Network Information Center (KRNIC: http://stat.nic.or.kr/), December 2001.

 

Also, according to KRNIC, 96.85 percent of elementary, 99.8 percent of junior high school, 99.9 percent of senior high school, and 99.3 percent of college students regularly use the Internet. This vividly demonstrates that the new generation is overwhelmingly leading the whole population in terms of Internet usage and is also very different from other generations. The R generation[5] approximately corresponds to two age groups from teens to 20s. The 386 Generation roughly overlaps from age group late 30s and early 40s. Heavy concentration in the young generation in the age composition of Internet users has directed the picture of the information society in Korea producing new socio-political power groups or generations such as the ‘386’ and ‘R generation.’

 

              In early 1990s, Internet users in Korean society were not recognizable. It was in the very late 1990s that Internet infrastructure and usage dramatically expanded. A great leap forward in this category took place from 1998 to 1999. Since 1999, every year almost one fourth of the total population has been newly added to this category. In 2001, two years after, Korea becomes an Internet society where more than half of total population has accessed and used the Internet. Table 5 clearly demonstrates that growth rate of the number of Internet users doubled from 1995 until 1997 tripled in 1998 and held steady in 1999. Table 6 on the monthly increasing number of Internet Protocol Addresses also supports this argument. It is well reflected in the world statistics among leading countries in Informatization. In terms of the number of Internet users per 100 persons, Korea is ranked fifth among thirty OECD countries, led by Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Canada. (Source: Ministry of Information and Communication). In terms of on-line stock transactions, Korea is leading world. By June of 2000, 56.9 percent of total stock transactions were executed online in comparison to other countries: Japan 1.8%, Taiwan 4.5%, Sweden 7.2%, France 28%, Canada 33-40%, the US around 40%. (MIC) According to OECD Outlook 2001, Korea ranked third in the rate of investment in Knowledge R&D following number one Sweden and number two the United States among 24 countries. (MIC)

 

[Table 5] Number of Internet Users in Korea (1,000 persons)

Year

‘95

‘96

‘97

‘98

‘99

‘00

‘01

#s

366

731

1,634

3,103

10,860

19,040

24,380

Source: Korean Network Information Center (KRNIC)

 

[Table 6] Number of IP Address

Feb ‘95

Feb. ‘96

Apr. ‘97

Feb.

‘98

Feb. ‘99

Dec. ‘99

Feb ‘00

Dec. ‘00

Feb. ‘01

Feb. ‘02

June ‘02

3,745

7,329

13,885

16,285

19,613

28,342

11,188,736

 

18,921,984

22,985,216

23,509,504

Source: Korean Network Information Center (KRNIC)

 

It is not only the speed of the development of Internet environment but also the timing of such unprecedented expansions in Internet environments that deserves scholarly attention. Such a rapidly increasing rate in the penetration of Internet usage into the total population resulted in the formation of powerful political forces. In the 2000 general election, such empowered citizens and their alliance defeated corrupt politicians from the National Assembly. Taking Diani’s (2001) argument that the social capital is an outcome of social movement, this article argues that the 386 Generation is a social capital as an outcome of democratization movements since the 1960s and this social capital combined with the Internet can produce unprecedented political power affecting election outcome. While the 386 Generation was born as a fairly coherent group across university campus in the 1980s, the World Cup Game in 2002 has demonstrated that the Internet can facilitate social capital creating many and unspecified mass into a well-coordinated resources carrying out the public goods mobilizing .

 

Other Environments for Informatization

In terms of overall indicators in information technology (IT) infrastructure, Korea is ranked in the second group of countries but is rapidly catching up with leading countries mostly in Western Europe. In many ways, Korea is a late starter in the informatization race. In order to achieve the full status of an information society, not only technology infrastructure but also socio-political infrastructure is necessary. The United States is the best example of a most advanced information society not only because it leads the technology revolution but also because its socio-political infrastructure has been mature enough to keep up with technological inventions in the fields of information and telecommunications technology. Liberal political culture and legal resources such as the First Amendment and the Freedom of Information Act that guarantee the freedom of speech have served as the best soil for the information society.

 

In this perspective, Korean society lacks such generic legal infrastructure and political culture. Due to its miraculous but very late economic development, information technology industry in Korea joined world competitions in the 1980s. Partly because of military dictatorship and partly because of authoritarian political culture originating from Confucianism and Japanese colonialism, Korean society has never been properly exposed to liberal democratic political culture until the late 1980s. It was the June Resistance in 1986 that overthrew the military regime and brought forth the first civilian democratic regime.

However, in its actual usage of the Internet and the impacts of the information and telecommunications technology upon society, economy, and politics, Korea deserves scholarly analysis. In terms of high-speed broad bandwidth connectivity and Internet game market size, Korea is the world leader. Its actual Internet usage is also phenomenal. Korea is ranked number five in the world in terms of Internet users per one hundred persons in the world (OECD, 2001) Korea with 69.3 percent is far advanced in online stock transactions outrunning the United States and Canada with their online transactions of around 40 percent. (MIC, 2001)

However, what really makes Korea’s informatization unique is not only some leading indicators in these areas but its impacts upon society in general. The 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup illuminated a very different picture of Korea for the world soccer fans. major world news organizations and media (New York Times, June 30; ???) highlighted the 120,000 strong official fan club of the national soccer team, the Red Devils, [quoting citing] the explosive but positive energy it produced. It was the Internet that mobilized such social capital [of among] Korean fans. In Internet voting, the power of Korean Netizen has been demonstrated in ICANN and World Cup voting and also in worldwide Internet polls. In the 2000 general election, the power of the alliance of civic organizations that defeated half of the incumbents in the National Assembly would have been impossible without Internet. These are the good examples illustrating that informatization is completed not only by the establishment information and telecommunications technology infrastructure but also by the presence of social capital utilizing technological infrastructure.

 

IT Policy

Obviously, government policy is the first to be recognized. The role of the state and bureaucracy in its miraculous economic development during the 1960s – 1980s in Korea has well been documented and evaluated. A series of “The Five-Year Economic Development Plan” was an internationally well-known example of how an industrial policy can make real differences in a country’s economic fate. In many indicators, Korea is also leading in informatization in the world. In its efforts to take initiatives for informatization, the role of the state and bureaucracy has been one of the most important factors. The strong developmental state tradition has remained intact in the course of the Information Technology revolution.

 

The essential feature of the developmental state and industrial policy is that the state acts as an entrepreneur, targeting national strategic industries and nurturing them. The light industry of the 1960s, heavy industry in 1970s and 1980s and the restructuring of industry to electronics in the late 1980s were the winners in Korean economic development processes.  Once targeted, R&D, financing, and marketing also benefited from government involvement. While it is not identical to the previous role of the developmental state in the miracle of Han River, information technology policy resembles many aspects of past industrial policy.

 

It was a different kind of crisis that [has driven drove] government into another stage of economic system. Chronic economic poverty since the Yi dynasty in 1392 drove President Park to a war of export. However, it was the financial crisis of 1997 that drove the Kim Dae Jung government toward information technology policy. In the late 1990s, the free flow of money across the territorial boundaries was strongly supported by the global financial information technology infrastructure. ??? It was described as an ‘electronic herd’ [Lexus and Olive Tree] Also, such an electronic stampede swept around the Asian countries of Thailand, Malaysia, and finally Korea. Not only did the violence of the international free flow of finance destabilize the stock markets in Asia but also differences between global and local standards in accounting systems, degrees of market liberalization, and relationships between state and economy. The famous arguments between the Prime Minister Mahartyr ??? and the Clinton administration [demonstrate highlight] such conflicts.

 

The Korean government, barely surviving by means of an infusion from the IMF’s crisis managing fund, took this crisis as an opportunity to restructure heavy reliance on second industry (especially corporate restructuring)[6], to deregulate[7] customary practices of heavy government intervention in the market, to privatize public corporations[8], and to liberalize the market[9].

In order to stimulate economic recovery, Kim Dae Jung’s government specifically focused on IT industry, providing tax incentives and liberal environments especially to foreign companies and foreign direct investment. After the financial crisis in 1997, the Korean government initiated various incentives for foreign high-tech companies: tax reduction for high-tech businesses, especially ones in foreign investment zones and service businesses in assistance of advanced industries (national tax for 10 years, local tax for 15 years); a rent reduction policy in industrial complexes for foreign companies (Kwang-ju, Chon-an), 25 national industrial complexes, and foreign investment zones (100% of reduction for high-tech businesses and 75% of reduction for general manufacturing industries). M&A activities (hostile takeovers) were also allowed in May 1998. Table ??? clearly shows the relative importance of IT industry in foreign direct investment in the Korean economy. In 1997, FDI in Korean IT industry stood at 0.4 billion US dollars. ????

 

[Table 7] Foreign Direct Investment (unit: USD billion)

Category

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001. 1/4

IT sector

0.4

2.0

2.3

2.7

3.3

IT share of total economy(%)

5.4

22.8

14.8

17.5

72.6

Equipment

0.2

1.4

1.1

1.9

0.1

Service

0.2

0.6

1.0

0.4

3.2

Software

0.003

0.003

0.2

0.4

0.04

* Source: Korea Association of Information and Telecommunication

 

Civil Society and Social Capital

The collapse of Eastern European communist regimes has spotlighted the role of civil society in the process of democratization. Putnam (1993; 1995) and Fukuyama (1995) also point out the similar concept, social capital, as one of the most important ingredients in achieving democracy and a successful economy. Though seemingly alike, these concepts are quite the same, and this needs to be illuminated. The concept of civil society is a badly under-theorized, polemical, and stretched theoretical category because it can be differently interpreted according to the specificity of historical, cultural, and regional contexts. If it is to account for some of the most important developments of contemporary life, its diverse nature has to be contextualized.

 

The evolution of the concept of civil society is indeed dialectical. It is dialectic because the concept of civil society originated in the political setting and was then adapted to economic, cultural, and social terminologies. The political connotation started with the notion of goodness to which the civil society is oriented but later came to be regarded as an evil force by Hegel. It also started from a collective sense of political community but later became to be understood as being part of the private and economic spheres. In history, the Classical notion of civil society was equated with politically organized commonwealths. As the forces of modernity began to undermine the political economy of the Classical and the Middle Ages, the gradual formation of national markets and national states generated a different understanding of civil society as an area where individual and collective economic interests converge as a market. Hegel interpreted it in a dichotomous perspective against the Reason ??? of  the state, putting it into disorganized and vicious settings. Civil society was no longer understood as a universal commonwealth but came to mean private property, individual interest, political democracy, the rule of law, and an economic order devoted to prosperity.

 

Second, originating from its dialectical nature, civil society is “relational” and “spatial or territorial” (Walzer, 1995:7) between state and economy, between public/collective and private, and between good and evil. Based on its relational and territorial nature, its sphere and influence vary depending upon temporal/spatial and historical contexts. In Western countries, the separation of the independent sphere of state and civil society is comparatively clearly articulated, while in countries under Confucian doctrine civil society is generally embraced by state due to the tradition of strong state and weak civil society. A neo-Tocquevillean view, among American intellectuals, of civil society is a set of informal norms supporting local intermediate associations for grass-roots democracy. Latin American conceptualization reflected both the struggle against the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s and a widespread conviction that conventional party politics had failed these societies. (Edwards, 2001: 3) In contemporary politics, the critical role of Catholic Church in the aftermath of collapsed communist regimes in Eastern Europe has added one more dimension to the concept, the religious nature.

 

[Table 8] Dialectical Nature of Civil Society

 

Classical/Middle Ages

Modern Period

Contemporary

Political

Commonwealth,

Political community

 

Political resistance (Latin America in 1970s-80s), Grass-root Democracy[10] (US)

Economic

 

Market economy

Against Neocorporatism (Western Europe in 1970s-80s)

Social/Cultural/

Religious

 

Civilization

Solidarity (Poland in 1970s), NGOs, Third Sectors

Source: Cohen (1995) and Edwards and Foley (2001)

 

As Table 8 summarizes, the concept of civil society connotes three general and contemporary characteristics: first, politically resistant to existing ruling order; second, economic sphere against state/government; third, non-economic and non-governmental organizations. Due to such a complex nature of historical evolution of the concept, traditional dichotomous interpretations of state versus economy, public versus private, good versus evil, do not seem to relevant in the contemporary phenomena with their problematic definitional fuzziness and lack of clarity: variations across the many civil societies. Cohen (1995:35) argues that such a dichotomous, two-part model, whether liberal and/or Marxian, whereby civil society includes everything outside of the state sector, is not helpful today. He begins from a three-part model, which differentiates among civil society, the state, and economy[11], understanding it to be a “sphere of social interaction distinct from economy and state, composed above all of associations (including the family) and publics” (Cohen, 1995:36-37).

 

From this perspective, this article attempts to direct its focus toward the essential nature of the concept. It is associational, relational, voluntary, democracy-oriented, and self-governing. It is also functional, diverse, divided, and horizontal, without a single goal to be identified. As globalization and informatization begin to challenge the conventional scope of the nation state system, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or the Third Sector as a part of civil society may contribute to the governing crisis (Til, 2000; ???).

 

              Then, the next important question arises as to the relationship between civil society and social capital. Compared to the nature of being tangible in the concept of civil society as a sphere of action, the concept of social capital is even less tangible than the former. If we broadly define the civil society as a nonpolitical and non-economic sector of society, the concept of social capital is about resources that enable members of society to act on issues. What social capital is to a civil society as the Internet is to information technology infrastructure.

According to Bourdieu (1986), social capital was first used in 1972 eventually developing the triad of physical, cultural, and social capitals. He views it as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition to membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of the [collectivity collectively]-owned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word” (Edwards and Foley, 2001:7). Coleman defines it as “a variety of entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure” (Edwards and Foley, 2001:9). Putnam defines it as “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enables participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Edwards and Foley, 2001:10).

 

These three scholars share some similarities and show some differences in their views on social capital. While Coleman and Bourdieu take a sociological approach, Putnam takes political one. While the former focuses on the more functional and instrumental aspects of social capital, the latter emphasizes collective actions contributing to democracy. However, common denominators are found in their analyses: resources, networks, and associational membership for certain norms, attitude, and trust. They all see social capital as resources for making some social actions possible. Putnam emphasizes the density of face-to-face contacts. The volume of social capital, according to Bourdieu, depends on the size of the network of connections that can be effectively mobilized. Summarizing divergent perspectives, social capital is multiple human resources networks, either actual or potential, with certain characteristics of shared norms, attitude, and trust that can be mobilized for social actions. Most agree that social capital is an independent variable affecting various social behaviors and phenomena such as civic engagement.[12] (Edwards and Foley, 2001:11)

 

The human relationship is not confined to the civil society. It goes across the dichotomous boundary of state and civil society. Civil society and state are somewhat territorial terms, while social capital is a temporal/spatial transcending concept, which can be articulated across the boundaries of civil society and state, regionally and globally, and so on. The concept of Social capital comprises potential networks of relationships among individuals, groups, and various social statuses to be mobilized for collective actions. Social capital also includes the norm, culture, and trust accumulated through collective actions and involvements in the variety of social-political issues across the members of community. Such shared experience enables members to work as a power group on issues. It can be either positive working as public goods or negative.[13] Social capital is also composed of capabilities accumulated among different networks of people on contingent issues that can contribute to a voluntary association and its democratic nature. ???? It is power and influence that make thing happening. The source of this power is neither capital nor physical. It is the human relationships that make social capital powerful. Human relationships consist of many different dimensions: private vs. public, socialization process, regional, school, etc.

 

Three issues are important in understanding the contemporary version of social capital. Social capital is an outcome of social and political movement. Diani (2001:207) raises relevant question on “How can we credit social movements with responsibility for macro-level changes that might as plausibly be the outcome of far broader cultural and socio- economic processes?” As Diani aptly points out, there is a burden of proof identifying causal paths linking movement actions to certain outcomes.

 

This paper argues that the combination of the politically mobilized social capital against an authoritarian regime in the process of democratization in modern Korea, culminated in 1986 of June Resistance, and the rapid informatization with the Internet in early 2000 has produced more massive and much more powerful social capital bringing forth the Defeat Movement in the 2000 General Election and the Red Devils in the 2002 Korea/Japan World Cup. In short, social movement during the period of the 1960s to the 1980s built social capital and the 386 Generation, which played a pivotal role in this process. Comprised of former university student president (power group) and professionals centering on the 386 Generation, PowerVision21, an outcome of 386 Generation-led student democratic movement against authoritarian regimes and social injustice, was established in 1999 (http://www.powervision21.or.kr/).  Now n their forties, members of this generation lead Korean society in both the public and private sectors. This social capital as an outcome of social movement was greatly facilitated by the fast networking system, the Internet in the April 2000 General Election. This event demonstrated the power of the Internet when it allied with human resources. Such precedence also affected the mobilization process of Red Devils in the 2002Korea/Japan World Cup games.

 

Going back to Diani’s question on the causal links between social movement and social capital as an outcome of social movement and his research focus on the social networks that movement actors are involved in and their evolution over time (2001:208, 207), the explosive growth of civic organizations since the June Resistance in 1987 serves as evidence. Centering on the Citizens' Council for Economic Justice (CCEJ, Kyung-shil-lyun in Korean; http://www.ccej.or.kr/main.html), the nation's largest civic organization established in 1989 and Cyber People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (Cham-yeo-yeon-dae in Korean; http://www.peoplepower21. org/) established in 1994, the Citizens' Commission for a Fair Election in motivating citizen participation accomplished a revolutionary election campaign. This supports Diani’s (2001:208, 207) points that “mobilization processes rely heavily upon previous networks of exchange and solidarity” and, thus, we need to “focus (focusing) on their capacity to create new forms of social capital.”

 

[Table 9] 5 Major Korean Newspapers’ Coverage on Civic Organizations

Year

Citizen Org.

NGO

Private Org.

Social Org.

Total in Average

1991

91

0

138

189

418

1992

103

8

212

175

498

1993

102

11

151

152

416

1994

114

16

146

144

420

1995

147

63

108

138

456

1996

323

44

177

210

754

1997

510

50

234

302

1096

1998

631

32

235

311

1209

1999

1183

227

204

278

1892

2000

2515

295

241

461

3512

Source: Table 2-1 from Choo, Sungsoo and Nam, Jungil. 2001. Korea NGO Report, 2001, Seoul: Hanyang University Press, page. 25. Author slightly revised the original table, which put the average number of coverage in two to five major newspapers, in its forms. The original table has coverage number of each newspaper and this article put the average of it and added the last column of Total in Average.

 

                   Table 9 may confuse readers in Western countries. Weak civil society in Korea generated low numbers of civic organizations. First of all, in general, there are four representative terms mixed together: Citizen, NGO, Private, and Social organizations used without clear differentiations in their use. This context explains why the adjectives ‘private’ or ‘social’ are attached before an organization’s title: connoting that it is not a government organization. Thus, it can be said that these two categories of either ‘private’ or ‘social’ organizations are not typical civic ones. They are rather quasi-government organizations, and they were established in the tradition of weak civil society, mostly supported financially by government. That is why these two categories of organizations did not increase much from1991. However, organizations with the adjective ‘citizen’ or Non-Governmental Organizations are prospering with astonishing rates of increase. Until 1995, the total numbers of Newspaper references remained within 500. However, since 1996, the increasing rate in the total amount of newspaper coverage has almost doubled. Especially, it was the year 2000 that marked the most rapid increase in newspaper coverage from 1892 in 1999 to 3512 in 2000. In 1991, no major newspaper used the term, ‘NGO’. Newspaper coverage using the term, ‘Citizen Organization’ stood at little more than 100. In nine years, it has grown 20 times. This table shows that the rapidly growing influence of civic organizations in Korea corresponds to rapid informatization in Korea, especially in the actual usage of information technology including the Internet as discussed in previous sections.

INSERT DATA ON 386 GENERATION’S PARTICIPATION IN THESE CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS ( I NEED REAL NUMBERS)

 

Conventional understanding on social capital was formed before the era of the Internet. Due to rapid development and wide applications of IT in daily life, the size of social capital can theoretically be expanded at the speed of light, the Internet.  Accordingly, the speed and scope of mobilizations for achieving public goods can surpass previous imagination. With increases in the size of human networks and their speed, the power of social capital can have much stronger and effective impacts on collective actions. Social capital belonging to non-political and non-economic sectors of society can exert much stronger influences over existing political, economic, and cultural settings, resulting in changes in society in general. The Defeat Movement in the 2000 General Election and the Red Devils’ contribution to a spirited but orderly and safe World Cup in 2002 are good examples of how informatization can generate unforeseeable social actions and changes.

             

Social capital in Korea

Since the beginning of the Yi Dynasty in 1392, Confucianism has been the most fundamental and enduring source for Korean political culture. Confucianism like Hegelian tradition has articulated a dichotomous value system putting ??? ‘being public’ over ‘being private,’ the state over society, statecraft over market, and seniority over juniority. Such a value system has been embedded in society for more than a thousand years and has become the basis of invincible political culture despite the Westernization and modernization of the twentieth century. In a/ that strictly class-based hierarchical system, the ruling class such as the gentry and scholarly bureaucrats had attempted to regulate the power and activity of the merchant class by criticizing the merchant activity as evil in their remonstrance to the King. Thus, the growth of civil society and voluntary association in the market was suffocated, while the public sphere protecting the bourgeoisie interests, was successfully rooted in Western political culture. Most civil organization even in the twentieth century in Korea was heavily dependent upon financial support from government (??? Choi Buyng Koo’s). The exception was the students and minor intelligentsia, which stood against undemocratic and authoritarian civilian and military regimes.

 

Joo and Nam (2001: 25) conducted a content analysis on the frequency of four different organizations: citizen, non-government, private, and social. Newspapers surveyed were two to four major daily newspapers. This table shows two important points. First, the concept on civil society and its activities has not been clarified. There are many different terms, which do seem to suggest the same content of activities. Second, around mid-1990s, the spheres of civil society exploded in Korea’s social context. The frequency of newspaper articles more than doubled from mid-1990s toward year 2000.  

[??? Insert Table that tells the weak representation of civil or NGO things.]

 

              It was in the June Resistance of 1986 that such an unbalanced relationship between state and civil society was turned upside down. Between 1987 and 1993, the military regime ended, and the first democratic civilian government was inaugurated in 1993 with the transitional quasi-democratic regime of Rho Tae Woo. During the democratization process of the early 1980s, militant anti-government organizations multiplied and formed civic alliances. They had a very clear political goal, to achieve democracy. After the inauguration of civilian democratic government, these politically oriented anti-government civic organizations lost their target for action and reason for existence. They began to divert their primary interests from politics to socio-economic areas such as consumer protection, economic justice, and environmental protection. The June Resistance resulted in the explosive growth of civic organization in its numbers and its influence. The direct outcome of such massive mobilization was the 386 Generation. ???Kwon and Lee in their article, found that among 90 selected as major civil organizations in Korea, 65 were established since 1987, 20 between 1945 and 1987, and 5 before 1945. This demonstrates that the largest number and the most important of civil organizations were established after 1987, when the June Resistance achieved democratization in Korean society.

 

              The 386 generation, which comprises people in its thirties who were born in the 1960s and were university students during the 1980s. It is a generation that was a by-product of the 1980s’ democratization process in Korean history. Due to its origins, it was politically mobilized in the late 1980s and played a central role in the transition from the military regime to a civilian democratic system. It has exerted a great influence upon not just political but also socio-economic issues in contemporary politics in Korean society. It is critical of established power groups and has shown strong nationalism and group-orientation. It is often, however, known for its excessive seriousness and formality as a result of its struggle to end the military dictatorship of the past.

 

              The spatio-temporally shared experience of the 386-generation is its social capital, which is to be mobilized toward issues. Such newly formulated human density of coherent socio-political force was incidentally combined with the nationally infused technological interconnectivity capacity, the Internet, in the late 1990s. It is information technology that equipped that social capital with a powerful tool for an effective communication channel. In so doing, the group’s political agenda was realized in cyberspace through the Defeat Movement in the 2000 General Election. It was also social capital that gave meaning to technology, the Internet and the byproduct of a new political sphere, cyberspace. The combination of information technology and social capital generated the socio-political basis for changes in society.

 

Defeat Movement: Civic Activism in the Information Age

               

The unveiling of a blacklist of "unfit candidates" for the upcoming April 13th general election for the National Assembly, civic activism, fueled a hot debate in Korean politics. The Citizens' Council for Economic Justice (CCEJ, Kyung-shil-lyun in Korean), the nation's largest civic organization released a list of 164 politicians. It was joined by another civic organization, the Citizens' Commission for a Fair Election in motivating citizen participation. Several web sites such as www.ngokorea.org, www.naksun.co.kr, and www.emocracy.co.kr were created to defeat the named political figures based on evidence of crimes such as corruption or embezzlement related to past elections, political record such as involvement in past authoritarian regimes, votes against reforms, or change of party affiliation, and personal defects such as unethical behavior and vulgar or discriminatory statements. This movement was the first of its kind in that country's history.

 

With the Citizens' Coalition for the 2000 General Election's home page (www.ngokorea.org) recording 50,000 visitors since its opening [5 days ago in January of 2002, the Internet made its mark as the most influential medium in contemporary Korean politics. The list, which singled out reform-resistant lawmakers, exploiters of regional antagonism, and 'low-quality' politicians, included 128 members of the National Assembly, 42 percent of the incumbents, out of a total of 299 seats. The Assembly is composed of three major parties, the ruling National Congress for New Politics, its coalition partner the United Liberal Democracy and the opposition Grand National Party.

 

Further, the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice intended to file complaints from potential candidates who would be excluded from their parties' official nomination and to file cases charging constitutional violations against party leaders.  Conventionally, the party nomination process had been obscured in back-room deals between party leaders and candidates. The old practices in the selection of party candidates were based more on personal relationships with party leaders or on the scale of funds contributed to political parties than on objective evaluations of candidates' qualifications and electoral popularity.

             

Contrasting with advanced democratic countries, where civic groups such as Americans for Democratic Action (http://adaction.org) legally rate the activities of their representatives and other elected officials, current Korean election law prohibits all except individuals and labor unions from engaging in political campaigns supporting specific candidates and makes such activities punishable by law. Reflecting the interests of incumbents, the Constitutional Court and the Central Election Management Commission upheld the current law on the grounds that it keeps elections fair. Activists argue that this 'election defeat movement' is fair because it makes relevant information available to voters and helps them make reasonable choices. Reacting to the denunciation of political institutions and politicians, and supported by the public, civic organizations launched a national campaign to revise the election law. On January 19, the twentieth day after the release of the blacklist, the ruling and opposition parties bowed to citizen activism and respectively promised to "refer to" or "respect" the blacklist in the nominating process for the April general election. Also, they cautiously suggested that the current election law needed to be revised to allow rating activities by civic organizations.

 

Korea has drastically expanded its investment in information technology and information infrastructure. According to Alexa statistics (www.alexa.com), Korean yahoo ranks second among the world's Internet companies in terms of access time. One fourth of the total population, around 40 million, enjoys Internet access. Fifty percent of Koreans use cellular phones. There are fifteen thousand commercialized personal computer shops doing business. Even the impatient national character moves Korea to be among the leading countries in the Information Age. Empowered by the wide deployment of information technology, such a government information policy reverses the traditional superiority of the state and political institutions over civil society and citizens. It is the power of information technology, the Internet that swiftly formed the alliance of over 300 civic organizations, enabling them to establish a political dialogue, "a strategic conversation" across diverse communities. The power of anonymity in virtual space has allowed such a negative election campaign for the first time in Korean political history. With a more transparent political system, information on each politician becomes available, making the party nominating process more objective, and dismantling the absolute power of a handful of party leaders. The information society, thus, is beginning to erode existing political systems and ideology, bringing about the devolution of traditional political authority.

Virtual space allows citizens to avoid the nation-state's conventional jurisdiction over political activities. The national government has no established legal authority to restrict the flow of information if the web site is opened overseas. It is not subject to Korean election laws. This Korean case clearly indicates that the dispersed availability of information and communications technologies can be far more relevant than levels of income for predicting a nation's degree of democratization. The Information revolution will lead us to a different kind of political system, accelerating democratization, especially in areas where authoritarian rule has prevailed.

 

World Cup, Red Devils and the R Generation

 

To the amazement of soccer-crazed Europe and Latin America, a cumulative 22 million people, mostly teens and college students, voluntarily poured onto the streets of Seoul and other major cities to root for Korea in its seven World cup matches. ((Yoo, July 2, 2002) In Seoul alone, about three million people flooded City Hall Plaza and Kwanghwamoon intersection in the center of the capital. (Kwak, July 2, 2002) It was a young IT-friendly Internet generation that activated unprecedented power of the World Cup fan club, the Red Devils.

 

The Red Devils[14] is the official 120,000-member fan club of the national soccer team. Networking through the Internet, the Red Devils club has come to represent the excitement, passion and, patriotism of the Korean cheering squad. The street filled Red Devils revived national ethos that was depressed by the national financial bankrupt, called the IMF crisis in 1997. The Red Devil created enormous energy and gave people a hope that they can do whatever they want together. It is the power of social capital that can contribute to achieve some public goods as Putnam, Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman point out. Despite such massive gathering in a very short time period, there had been no accidents, fights, or thefts reported. Rather acting like Hooligans, the Red Devils behaved in order leaving streets without wastes and any problem. National Police Commissioner Lee, Pal-ho sent a letter to the Red Devils thanking them for their exemplary support, which contributed the hosting a “safe World Cup.”

[Table 10] Comparison of 386 and R Generations

 

386 Generation

N Generation[15]

R Generation

Age range

40s

20s and 30s

Teens and 20s

Origin

Democratic movement

Social

Sports fans

Nature

Political

Group Orientation

Social Individualistic

Social & Diverse

Group-oriented but respecting individuality

Network

Face-to-face

Face-to-face & Internet

Internet

Public Goods

Democracy

Political Watchdog

Club or association

Public Awareness

Social energy

Order, Safety

 

 

 

 

 

Oriented as a soccer fan club, the R Generation[16] is apolitical while the 386 Generation is strongly politically oriented.  The latter stood against military dictatorship and played political roles as dissenting voices and watchdogs. Their ultimate goal was to dethrone military dictators and to achieve a full democracy. Inherited with the first civilian, democratic regime in 1993, the main goal of the former has been to achieve their individual goals, especially to be in safer situation in materialistic well being since they experienced national bankruptcy in their juvenile period. However, they are well connected by Internet so that they can form formidable opinion and action groups on issues even though they are generally anonymous to each other.

 

It is interesting to see that the joie de vivre of the Red Devils would not have been possible without Korea’s top-notch communications infrastructure. (Chung, 2002) While the 386 Generation was networked face-to-face, the Red Devils exchanged views and feelings about World Cup matches through the new Internet communications tool,  the instant messenger, which Korea has more than 10 million subscribers. During the third-place match between Korea and Turkey on Saturday night, Red Devils staged its last massive flip card display in Daegu World Cup stadium showing CU@K-League, short for “See you at Korean League. It urges compatriots to redirect their enthusiastic support toward the nation’s sole professional football league in somewhat cryptic Internet-style language. In fact, the K-League has long suffered from a dearth of spectators, while baseball is touted as the country’s favorite pastime. It demonstrates the Internet as a thrilling channel for many soccer fans in Korea.

 

 


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June 30, 2002, Sunday

ON SOCCER; How a Sport Galvanized South Korea

 

By Jere Longman (NYT)

 

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[1] According to him, the founder of 3com, a network would increase in value with the addition of each new user and that this value could be defined as the square of the number of users: Utility=(number of users)² where² denotes the square. For example, if a network has one user, and one more user is added to it, then the size of the users would double, but the utility would grow by 400 percent. From The Complete Idiot’s Guide to e-Commerce, p.103, by Bob s and Thompson, M and Speaker, M. 2000. Indianapolis: QUE.

[2] Steinfield and Salvaggio ( 1989:11)

[3] In general, Informatization index can be measure by the following ITU formula, which is widely adopted in academia and industry.

Composition of Informatization Index

Divisions

Item

Formula

Computer

PC supply

(Number of PCs supplied/Population) x 100

Internet

Internet host

(Number of Internet host/Population) x 1,000

Internet user

(Number of Internet user /Population) x 1,000

Telecomm-

unication

Fixed-line phone circuit

(Number of Fixed-line phone circuit /Population) x 100

Mobile phone subscriber

(Number of Mobile phone subscriber /Population) x 100

Broad-

casting

TV supply

(Number of TV supplied/Households) x 100

CATV subscriber

(Number of CATV supplied/Household) x 100

 

[4] Korean Network Information Center (KRNIC) just released updated statistics on the increase in the Internet population by age groups. Estimated 25.6 million people, or 58 percent of the country's population, use the net at least once a month. The figures represent an increase of 1.4 percent over the number of users tallied last December when 56.6 percent or 24.3 million people logged onto the Internet. By demographic, 93.4 percent of those aged between six and 19 were connected to the Internet. This was followed by an online user rate of 86 percent and 66.7 percent for those in their 20s and 30s, while the Internet connection rate for people in their 40s and 50s fell off to 38.9 percent and 9.6 percent, respectively. Refer to Korea Herald article on July 25, 2002.

 

[5] The Hyundai Research Institute, an affiliate of Hyundai Group, named it the “R generation”, borrowing from the Red Devils, the red-clad young soccer fans who led the phenomenal stadium and street cheering for the Korean squad during the World Cup tournament in June of 2002.

[6] Government set the standards for Chabol workout program in debt-to-equity ratio, reduction in non-performing long-term bank loans, electing board directors from outside company, and consolidating financial statement. According to the report of the Ministry of Finance and Economy on January 4, 2000, the top five chaebols - Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG, and SK - have reduced 2.3 trillion won of their assets (19.5 percent of their total assets) either through selling off their subsidiaries to more competitive companies (i.e., semiconductors, oil refining, and power generation facilities) or through spinning off the subsidiaries to independent companies (i.e., aircraft, rolling stock, petrochemicals, and vessel engines). The five largest conglomerates also slashed 8.9 trillion won of their debts (28.1 percent of their total liabilities) by eliminating overlapping assets, swapping debts to equities, and attracting foreign investments. The five largest Korean chaebols have virtually completed their industrial restructuring of nine core sectors as of the end of December, 1999, according to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. These sectors include petrochemicals, semiconductors, aircraft, automobiles, electronics, oil refining, power generation facilities, vessel engines, and rolling stock. Restructuring efforts in the nine core sectors, which were aimed at enhancing international competitiveness of the five chaebols, have been implemented through their voluntary participation.

[7] The government has already deregulated 71 percent of all 11,125 public administration regulations, and will moderate the remaining regulations to pave the way for a solid knowledge-based economy. By September 2000, a comprehensive deregulatory plan will be established, the implementation of which will be completed by end-2001.

 

[8] A Government Renovation Committee is established to set up action programs for public sector reform and to evaluate their performance. Moreover, the privatization of such government-owned enterprises as POSCO and Korea Heavy Industries & Construction will be enforced as scheduled.

[9] There is no ceiling on foreign ownership of special or value-added service providers. And the ceiling on single person ownership of facilities-based service providers has been abolished except Korea Telecom. Ceiling on foreign aggregate ownership of facilities-based service providers is 49% . Acquisition by a non-telecom company has been also allowed. There is no ceiling in telecommunications equipment and software businesses.

[10] It is political in that its eventual goal is to strengthen democracy but it is social in that it sees its activities apolitical, rather social and cultural.

[11] One must distinguish civil society both from what I call a “political society” of parties, political organizations, and political public spheres (parliaments) and from an “economic society” composed of the organizations of production, distribution, and associated publics, usually firms, cooperatives, institutions of collective bargaining, unions, councils, etc. (Cohen, 1995: 36-38)

[12] Empirical research on the impact of social capital as an independent variable upon society is well documented in Edwards, Foley, and Diani (2001)’s Beyond Tocqueville.

[13] Knack and Keefer (1997) empirically examine the correlation between the presence of sound social capital and the successful economic performance in their cross-country research.

[14] The term Red Devils dates back to 1983, the year the nation’s under-20 squad advanced to the semifinals of the World Youth Championship in Mexico. Stunned by the unexpected success of the Korean side, foreign media described the players as Red Devils storming the field in reference to the color of their uniforms. It kicked off its activities in the qualifying rounds of the 1998 France World Cup (Yoo, July 2, 2002)

 

[15] The N generation, the one after the 386 Generation, however, is oriented toward individualism and patronizes the Internet.

[16] The R generation, rooted in the N generation, is a combination of the 386 and the N generation. It is group-oriented but respects individuality. Its members networked themselves through the Internet and gathered by the millions in spontaneous displays of patriotism. (Yoo, July 2, 2002)] This generation has open-minded patriotism, as was clearly demonstrated in its fervent craze for Guus Hiddink, the Dutch coach of the Korean soccer team, and its support for foreign teams. Hyundai Research Institute report points out that “this R generation helped induce harmony by attracting people from all walks of life to the streets. The new generation has given us hope that it will create harmony in Korea’s future. It also recognized the new generation’s potential and characteristics as channeling into social energy, rather than dismissing it as a temporary fad.(Kim, 2002 July 01)”