Katie Henneman
Final Paper
International Public and NGO Management
“It is for the first time that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is presenting an annual financial report providing details of how it has used its extrabudgetary funds to carry out its planned activities. This document forms part of OCHA’s annual cycle of planning, fundraising, and reporting. The report provides an account of actual income and expenditures and highlights OCHA’s planned activities, achievements, and some of the lessons learned. I hope that the report will serve to strengthen our dialogue with donors and promote greater accountability.”
—Kenzo Oshima, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, OCHA Annual Report 2002
the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in 2002
Following the year 2002, and for the first time, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) produced a financial report to donors in an effort to provide a “consolidated and transparent picture of the activities and achievements of OCHA’s work in the use of donor contributions.”[1] Overall, the report is a notable effort at providing clear information about the use of donor funds for the wide array of OCHA projects worldwide. What is perhaps less clear are the medium- and long-term goals of the organization and how the activities it undertook on a daily basis in 2002 contributed to those objectives. Much of OCHA’s work is demand-driven. However, according to its mission statement, OCHA also strives for preparedness and prevention (where possible) of natural disasters and complex emergencies. This paper seeks to measure these aspects of OCHA’s performance during 2002. It will be seen that the formulation of the vision, objectives and outcomes of the Office in this annual report leave the outside observer with many questions. Preparedness and prevention activities are underway, and many achievements are cited, but their impact on OCHA’s long-term vision remains ambiguous.
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), part of the United Nations Secretariat, has its roots in calls by the international community for better coordination of relief efforts, culminating in the 1991 General Assembly Resolution 46/182. The Resolution sought to strengthen the UN’s response to complex emergencies and natural disasters and led to the establishment of an Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) position. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary-General increased the status of the ERC to Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), OCHA’s predecessor, was created. DHA was reorganized into OCHA in 1998, in accordance with the Secretary-General’s reform efforts, and its mandate broadened.
According to the Office itself, OCHA’s mission is “… to mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advocate for the rights of people in need; promote preparedness and prevention; facilitate sustainable solutions.”[2] Much of OCHA’s work is driven by the demands posed worldwide by natural disasters and conflict. However, as the mission statement indicates, OCHA seeks to prepare as much as possible for such crises in advance and to prevent them, whenever possible. This paper will focus on measuring the success of OCHA in achieving the formidable task of preparing for and preventing crises. The Office’s specific objectives in this regard will be reviewed; the intended outcomes, outputs and activities discussed; and known results will be measured against derived performance indicators. In conclusion, the performance of OCHA will be critiqued based on this analysis.
During 2002, OCHA had US$65.7 million resources available[3] (78% from donor contributions, 6% from the Account for Program Support, and 16% from the UN regular budget). OCHA receives only 0.7% of the total UN regular budget, amounting to US$10.3 million in 2002.[4] Using the OCHA Annual Report 2002, it is difficult to gauge the exact percentage of funds that went strictly towards preparedness and prevention work, but it can be assumed that such work is part of core activities or headquarters projects and not field work. Such projects are primarily funded by the assessed budget and the Trust Fund for the Strengthening of OCHA. It should be noted that according to OCHA’s 2002 report, core activities and headquarters projects are consistently under-funded, causing the Office to borrow from unearmarked funds or to delay or preclude implementation.[5] The following core projects and divisions of OCHA claim objectives that fall under the rubric of preparedness and prevention[6]:
§ The Staff Development and Learning Project (SD&L), which addresses staff development and training needs for persons in headquarters and in the field. SD&L spent US$456,663 in 2002 (49% in staff costs).
§ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which brings together 17 humanitarian agencies (including UN agencies) and works on inter-agency consultation and implementation of IASC work plans. Expenditures for 2002 were US$369,454 (89% in staff costs).
§ The Response Coordination Branch (RCB) states that one of its objectives is to strengthen preparedness, response and policy development for natural disasters and complex emergencies. 2002 expenditures totaled US$2,965,670 (86% in staff costs).
§ The work of the Humanitarian Emergency Branch (HEB) includes advice to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on humanitarian crises, early warning and preparedness, and to the inter-departmental Framework for Coordination on early warning in countries of concern. Expenditures in 2002 were US$800,507 (59% in staff costs).
§ The Emergency Services Branch (ESB) maintains staff and materials to be able to provide a surge capacity in times of emergencies. US$278,084 was expended in 2002 (59% in staff costs).
§ The Military, Civil Defence, and Logistics Support Project (MCDU) runs relief exercises and cooperates with the World Food Program to stockpile supplies at the warehouse in Brindisi, Italy for rapid dispatch to future crises. Expenses in 2002 totaled US$1,178,680 (68% in staff costs).
§ The Emergency Environmental Services Project (EES) develops and provides preparedness training and tools so countries can respond better and more rapidly to emergencies. 2002 expenditures were US$159,185 (16% in staff costs).
§ The Information Management sector, and especially the Early Warning and Contingency Planning (EWCP) unit within the sector, works to collect and analyze information and disseminate reports to improve preparedness and response; also helps UN country teams foresee conflict and work to prevent or mitigate crises. Information Management expenditures in 2002 were US$2,623,209 (79% in staff costs).
Thus, the total for projects and divisions that do preparedness and prevention work was US$8,831,452 or approximately 13% of the OCHA 2002 budget. Unfortunately, the expenditure tables for each program are not broken down by assessed budget expenditures and extra-budgetary expenditures. Therefore, it is difficult to confirm the degree to which core activities were forced to borrow from other unearmarked funds.
While OCHA offers outside observers a mission statement, the statement does not actually provide clear objectives. The Merriam Webster dictionary defines the word objective as “Something toward which effort is directed: an aim, goal, or end of action.”[7] Rather than offering us a vision of the world that OCHA wants to create or the impact desired, the mission statement says how the Office believes it will get to some undefined end-state. Mobilization, coordination, facilitation, and promotion are all actions and not aims. Additionally, the timeframe for achieving OCHA’s objectives remains unclear in the 2002 annual report.
Nevertheless, the mission statement does provide insight into what the goals and objectives of the organization may be. For example, the ideal end-state of OCHA is probably effective and principled coordination of humanitarian action that includes national and international actors. While not specified, the organization is likely to target persons suffering in natural disasters and complex emergencies. The mission statement also indicates that a goal of the organization is to be prepared for and to prevent, where possible, complex emergencies, to be realized through international assistance. (It is assumed that natural disasters cannot be prevented, although preparation work may mitigate the extent of damage when natural disasters do occur.) Thus, OCHA’s mission statement could be reformulated as:
OCHA provides new staff with a copy of the OCHA Orientation Handbook.[8] The manual highlights the official OCHA mission statement, but also provides further insights into the objectives of the organization. For example, Appendix B lists five priority areas and eighteen goals for OCHA for the period 2001-2002. The five priority areas (Emergency Response Coordination, Policy Development, Advocacy, Information Management, Management Support) are better at painting a picture of the desired end-state than the 2002 annual report. Priority One, for example, reads, “Rapid and effective emergency response in coordinating both complex emergencies and natural disasters.”[9] None of the priority areas clearly correspond to the mission statement’s mention of “preparedness and prevention.” Consequently, few of the goals refer directly to this pillar of the mission statement. However, Goal 3 does call for “Strengthening OCHA’s role and capacity in preparedness, response and policy development on natural disasters and complex emergencies, including strengthening collaboration with external partners”[10] and Goal 15 states “Improved analysis of information for early warning and contingency planning for complex emergencies and natural disasters.”[11]
It seems that, according to the OCHA Orientation Handbook, “preparedness and prevention” is not a specific priority area, despite its notable mention in the mission statement. This paper seeks to determine whether this discordant note is affecting the performance of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the areas of preparedness and prevention.
In the annual report, each of the aforementioned projects and programs assumed to fall under the rubric of preparedness and prevention provide a list of specific objectives, activities, achievements and lessons learned for 2002. These specifics should aid the process of measuring the performance of the organization. Unfortunately, many of the specific objectives are similar to the overarching OCHA mission statement in that they speak of activities rather than a desired end-state. OCHA’s intended outcomes should stem from both the mission statement goals of being prepared for natural disasters and complex emergencies and preventing complex emergencies, when possible, and from the specific objectives of each division or branch. However, it is difficult to determine what exactly the desired outcomes of the organization are since they are not listed. While no specific outcomes are given, the specific objectives can be used to elicit the intended outcomes. These will be done on a project-by-project basis and will focus only on those outcomes that must be achieved to improve preparedness and prevention. In 2002[12], it appears that the desired outcomes were as follows:
§ Staff Development and Learning Project (SD&L) sought for staff to use the courses prepared by SD&L and for staff to use the lessons from the courses to make OCHA’s preparedness and prevention efforts more effective.
§ Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) aspired to have the improved coordination achieved by the Committee lead to reduced response time and more effective responses.
§ Response Coordination Branch (RCB) sought to improve preparedness mechanisms for natural disasters and complex emergencies.
§ Humanitarian Emergency Branch (HEB) aimed at providing more timely and useful advice to the USG/ERC on early warning and preparedness in countries of concern than was provided in previous years. HEB also sought to improve consultation and coordination among the political, peacekeeping, security, and public information functions of the Secretariat, UN agencies, NGOs, and the donor community in New York during 2002.
§ Emergency Services Branch (ESB) sought to enhance preparedness by developing emergency response tools that can be deployed quickly and effectively in times of crisis and that were used by OCHA staff.
§ Military, Civil Defence, and Logistics Support Project (MCDU) wanted to create a stockpile of potentially life-saving goods.
§ Emergency Environmental Services Project (EES) aimed to enhance preparedness by providing information and creating awareness.
§ Information Management sector, and especially the Early Warning and Contingency Planning (EWCP) unit within the sector, sought to improve preparedness by collecting, analyzing and disseminating information and by helping UN country teams to be able to foresee risks and crises and to come up with ways to mitigate or prevent such crises.
As was noted
above, few of the OCHA-provided objectives (most of which are actually outputs)
are specific and few indicate a time-bound target. Thus, they fail the “SMART” test[13]
(Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely) and should be
reformulated by each OCHA project or branch. As for the outcomes, which I have reformulated above from
the stated objectives, some projects and branches are quite good at determining
the outcomes that must occur to realize the objective of preparedness and
prevention. For example, the MCDU
goal of stockpiling supplies is a clear outcome that can be observed and that
can result from actions taken by the MCDU. One overall criticism can be made that the outcomes are
incomplete and do not provide all the necessary steps that must be taken for
preparedness and prevention to be realized. This may be a result of the inchoate formulation of specific
project and branch objectives.
The outputs and activities of each of the branches and projects are easier to derive as many activities are listed directly in the 2002 annual report.[14] Nevertheless, there is some confusion as activities are often listed under the achievements section as well. Are activities not listed under achievements therefore failures? What is the rationale for an activity being recognized as an achievement? Unfortunately, these questions cannot be answered at this time. Only those activities and outputs relating to preparedness and prevention will be provided here.
§ SD&L does not list activities, only achievements. None seem to relate to preparedness or prevention.
§
IASC activities
included “preparedness for an Iraq crisis” and “contingency planning.”
§ The RCB activities state that RCB contributed to “emergency roster deployments” and “contingency planning, notably in the Middle East,” and, under the achievements section, “Improved support to natural disaster response by increasing RDRA capacities and training of staff in natural disaster response.”
§
HEB “Provided
analytical advice to the inter-departmental Framework for Coordination on early
warning in countries of potential concern, including Cote d’Ivoire, Guyana,
Myanmar, Nepal, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.”
Under achievements, it states that HEB “Contributed to preparedness
planning in the Middle East for a possible conflict in Iraq.”
§
ESB “maintained
‘Surge Capacity’, a roster of staff who can be deployed quickly.” ESB also “Managed a database of
available relief personnel and supplies. Maintained a stockpile of basic
survival items in the UN Humanitarian Response Depot in Brindisi, Italy. Managed the UN Disaster Assessment and
Coordination. Established and
operationalised the Emergency Response Roster. Standardised bilateral agreements for the rapid deployment
of outside experts with a number of countries.”
§
MCDU “Participated
in planning and conduct of 11 humanitarian relief exercises involving military
and civil defence resources” and “Raised awareness among OCHA staff about the
facilities Brindisi offers.”
§
EES “Improved
rapid response by developing an internal emergency response roster, activating
the Surge Capacity project, and broadening external surge capacity arrangements
with donors and partners.”
§ Information Management reports a number of preparedness and prevention activities, as follows:
o “Finalized and field tested a comprehensive set of early warning indicators.
o “Distributed open source and internal reports on early warning indicators to inform and support joint UN system recommendations on prevention and preparedness.
o “Conducted inter-agency contingency planning exercises in countries considered high risk.
o “Developed a training module to strengthen headquarter staff capacity to apply the contingency planning methodology.
o “Strengthened links between contingency planning and inter-agency preparedness and with resource mobilization mechanisms.
There appears to be a disconnect between the objectives and outcomes of several projects and branches and their outputs and activities. SD&L, for example, could play a role in realizing preparedness and prevention but does not indicate any activities that do so. MCDU, on the other hand, listed activities that promote preparedness that don’t seem to stem from the elicited outcomes or objectives. Finally, most activities seem to be contributing to the broader objective of preparedness and prevention, but it is not always clear what the actual impact of the activities was on that broader goal. The causal relationship is implied, but not clearly spelled out. For example, it is assumed that in sharing early warning indicators with a country team, Information Management has impacted preparedness and prevention goals. However, there is no indication of how well the information was received or whether it was used by the country team.
OCHA has formulated its mission statement, objectives, outcomes and activities in a manner that makes it more difficult to gauge the organization’s performance in 2002, particularly with regards to preparedness and prevention. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be made with the help of performance indicators. Typically, performance indicators are derived from the intended objectives and outcomes of an organization and its specific projects. For that reason, the indicators must not be connected to specific activities, but rather to measuring if progress has been made in realizing the desired end-state. Thus, if OCHA’s goals regarding preparedness and prevention are reformulated (as above) to be “Achieve an effective and principled coordination of humanitarian action that … is prepared for such disasters and complex emergencies (and) prevents such emergencies, where possible,” then the following overall performance indicators could be applied to OCHA’s activities in 2002:
The OCHA Annual Report 2002 does not provide a summary or overview of how its various projects contributed to the mission statement and goals of the organization. However, OCHA in 2003: Activities and Extrabudgetary Funding Requirements[15], an OCHA publication that appeals to donors for contributions for the next calendar year, does highlight a number of OCHA’s achievements in 2002. With specific regards to preparedness and prevention, OCHA in 2003 presents these few achievements[16]:
Achievements are provided with regard to coordination, although specific mention of preparation and preparedness is not made[17]:
It is clear that some progress has been made in being better prepared to respond to complex emergencies and natural disasters. It is also evident that coordination efforts are underway worldwide. Somewhat less clear is the degree to which that coordination is more principled and effective and the extent to which emergencies are being prevented. In fact, in the same publication, OCHA provides the following challenge/constraint, which may be seen as an example of its inability to be adequately prepared for or to prevent complex emergencies in 2002:
Since these achievements provide limited insight into the overall performance of OCHA in 2002, it might be helpful to look at achievements stated in the OCHA Annual Report 2002 for each of the previously discussed sectors to see if program achievements can be applied to the organization’s broad performance indicators set forth above[19].
§ SD&L listed one conceivably relevant achievement: “Supported a competency-based mapping exercise to evaluate priorities and training gaps among RCB staff; organized orientation seminars for new Geneva-based staff.” This could be seen as a step toward providing training that enables staff to be better prepared and to do more effective coordination in the future, although this might be a bit of a stretch in tracing program achievements to the performance indicators.
§
The IASC similarly
provides an achievement that might relate to preparedness: “Worked with
Humanitarian Coordinators to endorse and implement an action plan to strengthen
the IASC and improve effectiveness and linkages with the field.” While the
impact on coordination effectiveness is clear, the impact on preparedness and
prevention is less so.
§ RCB provides several examples of coordination achievements, but only the following relates to preparedness and prevention: “Contributed to contingency planning, notably in the Middle East.” While this is listed as an achievement, there is no discussion of whether such contingency planning was successful or what impact RCB had on the overall process.
§
HEB also states
that it, “Contributed to contingency planning in the Middle East for a possible
conflict in Iraq.” No other achievements appear to relate to preparedness and
prevention.
§
ESB “Established
and operationalised the Emergency Response Roster,” and “Standardised bilateral
agreements for the rapid deployment of outside experts with a number of
countries,” both of which arguably made OCHA better prepared for natural
disasters and complex emergencies.
§
An applicable MCDU achievement might be: “MCDU’s course database lists 626 trained
persons, with 190 at the highest level, attracting some of the humanitarian
community’s best talent.” An
activity that probably ought to be reclassified as an achievement: “Raised
awareness among OCHA staff about the facilities Brindisi offers.” These both could be attributed to
improving OCHA’s preparedness.
§ EES contributed to preparedness as well with the following achievement: “Improved rapid response by developing an internal emergency response roster, activating the Surge Capacity project, and broadening external surge capacity arrangements with donors and partners.”
§ Information Management and EWCP probably did the most with regards to preparedness and prevention. Achievements listed include:
o “Tested and delivered the inter-agency contingency planning training module in regional workshops, Geneva, and New York.
o “Shared early warning indicators with 11 country teams.
o “Established an Internet forum on conflict prevention and developed internal web platform for sharing information on case studies under review.
o “Researched and developed in-depth early warning reports for senior management.”
Despite the significant achievements listed, it is frequently unclear how these achievements made the overall organization more effective at coordination, more principled, better prepared, and able to prevent complex emergencies. There seems to be a missing link between listing the achievements and stating why they are achievements. As has already been mentioned, there is no sense of how an achievement is defined and no linkage to overall performance indicators. No indicators or benchmarks are given for measuring performance. For example, EWCP shared early warning indicators with 11 country teams. How many country teams were briefed in 2001? What percentage of country teams have been briefed? Are these early warning indicators being put into practice? The achievements are notable, but leave many questions unanswered.
The publication OCHA in 2003: Activities and Extrabudgetary Funding Requirements demonstrates that the organization is moving in the right direction in terms of providing the necessary objectives and information for program evaluation. OCHA’s vision for 2003 is much more clearly stated for outside observers. The publication notes, “OCHA has drawn up a medium-term strategic plan for the period 2003-2005. Three strategic objectives have been identified for this period:
Eight overarching priorities are also provided for 2003. While none of the strategic objectives or overarching goals mention preparedness and prevention, which remain part of OCHA’s mission statement, the clearer message of OCHA’s vision for 2003 should be lauded. The OCHA in 2003 publication also sets out key priorities for each project and program area. While these tend to be activities and not vision statements or goals, and few benchmarks or indicators are provided, many of the priorities are measurable and realistic within the medium-term. For example, the “key priorities for 2003” of the Early Warning and Contingency Planning unit, part of the Information Management branch, are[21]:
Considering the degree to which OCHA continues to receive funds from outside donors—indeed most of its budget comes from voluntary sources—these donors must believe that the organization is doing quality work. In its 2002 Annual Report, OCHA provides a very clear and thorough breakdown of contributions and how those funds were used. OCHA also does a good job of providing a general overview of the numerous projects, both core and field activities, underway worldwide. A notable effort has been made to break out objectives, activities, achievements and lessons learned, and a clear hierarchy of the programs, namely major programs or departments, minor programs or divisions, subprograms or sections, and projects or units is delivered. The production of the 2002 Annual Report is an important step, and the OCHA in 2003 appeal for new funds demonstrates that OCHA is moving in the right direction in providing necessary information for outside observers. However, a number of unanswered questions and a somewhat unclear methodology, particularly regarding the categorization of achievements, remains.
This paper has focused on the arduous task of trying to measure OCHA’s performance in preparing for and preventing natural disasters and complex emergencies. This may not be OCHA’s main focus, as the percentage of the budget used for such purposes illustrates, but preparedness and prevention are essential components of OCHA’s mission statement. Several recommendations can be made to improve OCHA’s reporting on its preparedness and prevention activities. First, if in fact preparedness and prevention are not overarching priorities (i.e., they were not included as such in the 2003 publication), then OCHA should consider reformulating its mission statement. If, however, preparedness and prevention continue to be priorities then OCHA should provide more explicit information on its work in these areas. A better sense of the “big picture” and OCHA’s long-term vision should be given. For example, future annual reports should include a summary or overview of achievements from that year and how those achievements contributed toward reaching OCHA’s ultimate goals.
Furthermore, each branch and program should provide specific objectives. These objectives should be framed as an envisioned end-state, rather than activities, as they are currently done. It must be ensured that the specific objectives are contributing to the overall goals of the organization. Finally, OCHA should clarify why certain activities are classified as achievements. These achievements should be more clearly traced back to the overall goals of the organization. Clear indicators or benchmarks would help the outside observer determine performance indicators and analyze progress to better measure OCHA’s performance.
From the cited activities and achievements used in this paper, it should be clear to the reader that OCHA is doing some preparedness and prevention work. It seems as if, in 2002, OCHA was more successful on the preparedness front than on prevention. In fact, there appears to be no evidence in OCHA publications of any complex emergency being prevented with help from OCHA. Whether this is indeed the case, or whether it was not cited due to the current reporting focus on other activities, is unclear. Perhaps the extent to which donors earmark funds or do not fully fund headquarters projects and core activities may be hampering the effectiveness and implementation of preparedness and prevention programs. Hopefully, future OCHA publications will address these questions and provide better insight into the organization’s impact worldwide.
Mathiason, John, “Conversion of Vision into Programme Objectives and Outcomes,”
http://classes.maxwell.syr.edu/intlmgt/projects/iaeaconversiontool.htm, accessed 16 November 2003.
Merriam Webster online dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/, accessed 8 November
2003.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, OCHA Annual Report
2002: Activities and Use of Extrabudgetary Funds, New York: United Nations, 2002.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, OCHA in 2003: Activities
and Extrabudgetary Funding Requirements, New York: United Nations, 2002.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, OCHA Orientation
Handbook, New York: United Nations, 2002.
[1] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Annual Report 2002: Activities and Use of Extrabudgetary Funds, New York: United Nations, 2002, Introduction.
[2] United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Annual Report 2002: Activities and Use of
Extrabudgetary Funds, Introduction.
[3] Theoretically these resources were available; in fact, many contributions to OCHA were not given until the end of 2002. OCHA relied on carry-over funds from 2001 to meet its financial requirements. See Ibid, p. 9.
[4] Ibid, p. 4.
[5] Ibid, pp. 7, 10.
[6] Ibid, pp. 21-42.
[7] Merriam Webster online dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/, accessed 8 November 2003.
[8] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Orientation Handbook, New York: United Nations, 2002. (I obtained a copy of the handbook during a summer internship with OCHA; however, it is also available online at http://www.ReliefWeb.int.)
[9] Ibid, p. 136.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid, p. 138.
[12] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Annual Report 2002: Activities and Use of Extrabudgetary Funds, pp. 21-42.
[13] SMART Test developed by Professor John Mathiason in his paper “Conversion of Vision into Programme Objectives and Outcomes,” calls for objectives to be “Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Timely,” http://classes.maxwell.syr.edu/intlmgt/projects/iaeaconversiontool.htm, accessed 16 November 2003.
[14] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Annual Report 2002: Activities and Use of Extrabudgetary Funds, pp. 21-42.
[15] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA in 2003: Activities and Extrabudgetary Funding Requirements, New York: United Nations, 2002.
[16] Ibid, p. 4.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid, p. 6.
[19] Achievements quoted are from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Annual Report 2002: Activities and Use of Extrabudgetary Funds, pp. 21-42.
[20] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA in 2003: Activities and Extrabudgetary Funding Requirements, p. 8.
[21] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA in 2003: Activities and Extrabudgetary Funding Requirements, p. 46.