Kathryn Eissfeldt

IRP/PPA 632: International and Public NGO Management

Professor John Mathiason

Introduction:

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (formerly the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention) was set up in 1997 by merging the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme. It was established with a view to enhance the focus and capacity of United Nations to address the interrelated issues of drug control, crime prevention and international terrorism in all its forms. The mandate of the Office derives from several conventions and General Assembly resolutions, and the Office’s technical cooperation programme aims to help improve the capacity of Governments to execute those international commitments. The Office is headed by an Executive Director, appointed by the Secretary-General, and is co-located with the United Nations Office at Vienna, of which the Executive Director also serves as the Director-General.

This paper focuses only on the strategic framework for one region which is critical for the success of UNODC as a whole. This region is Central Asia which accounts for over half of world’s drug trade. The region includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and shares borders with all the countries in infamous golden crescent of drug trade. According to UNODC, “Central Asia is a primary transit corridor for Afghanistan-origin opium and heroin. Trafficking and seizures in opiates grew dramatically throughout the 1990s, especially in the period from 1993 to 2003”.

UNODC has a separate strategic framework for the Central Asia region, as can be expected given the importance of the region for achievement of the organizations global objectives. “The Strategic Programme Framework for Central Asia 2004 – 2007” is based on a situation analysis aimed at placing drug control and crime prevention in the context of the overall political economic, social, and security situation of the region. These include severe difficulties in post-independence political, social, and economic re-organization, increased poverty and deprivation, unemployment, increased drug abuse, corruption and crime. While the strategic framework is broadly regional in approach, it also purports “to take specific national issues into account.”

The strategic framework on Central Asia seeks to complement “many of the strategic priorities that have emerged in regional and international fora.” These include the recent Round Table for Central Asia: “A Consultative Mechanism for Drug and Crime Control,” held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 2004 in the context of the “Paris Pact,” and the Regional Meeting on Coordination and Cooperation in Dushanbe again in 2004. At this latter meeting, the strategic framework for 2004-07 received specific endorsement.

The strategic framework document identifies the following priority problems in the region:

(1) While the independence from USSR brought some benefits to Central Asian countries, it wasn't without its own problems. These countries incurred significant social costs, such as increased poverty and deprivation, unemployment, increased drug abuse, corruption and crime.

(2) While some wild-growing cannabis and ephedra are cultivated in the region, it isn't as significant a problem as is illicit drug-trafficking from Afghanistan. “Central Asia is a primary transit corridor for Afghanistan-origin opium and heroin,” and UNODC estimates trafficking and seizures in opiates to have gone up dramatically throughout the 1990s. Moreover, Central Asia has witnessed one of the strongest increases in opiates abuse in recent years – “a seven- fold increase in the period 1990-2002.”

(3) The incidence of HIV/AIDS transmission by injecting drug users has grown at an alarming rate, and there is very limited awareness among drug users and the general population concerning the risks of transmission through sharing of infected needles and paraphernalia.

(4) Human trafficking has become a significant problem, partly because of the poor economic situations. Trafficking of women to Russia and Eastern Europe for sexual exploitation has sharply risen.

(5) Transparency International believes that the corruption in the region has significantly gone up, which implies governance systems have worsened.

(6) Central Asia is also suffering from increased prevalence of fundamentalism and terrorism. Central Asia witnessed first suicide bomb attacks in 2004 in Uzbekistan. It is believed that terrorist groups are financing their operations from drug trafficking.

All these factors make the task on UNODC in the region very unenviable. On the basis of the problems identified above, UNODC has identified three strategic objectives in the region:

I. Counter narcotics enforcement. To develop human and technical capacities within the Central Asian states in support of effective action to reduce trafficking. This should result in an increase of operations targeting organized criminal groups involved in illicit drug trafficking.

II. Drug abuse & HIV/AIDS prevention. To improve national capacities to implement effectively multi-sectoral responses to drug abuse problems in Central Asia, including both prevention and treatment, and assure that effective HIV prevention and drug treatment services will be available and fully accessible to users of illicit drugs.

III. Countering organized crime, corruption & terrorism. To address effectively the primary issues in regard to organized crime, corruption and terrorism that affect the region. All countries of the region will have effective legal and institutional framework in place, in compliance with the respective conventions, and will have made significant progress in addressing corruption, human trafficking and terrorism, including the countering the financing of terrorism.

If we use the SMART framework developed by USAID and promoted by IAEA to analyze these objectives, we find them to fall woefully inadequate in meeting any of the criteria. The first objective, “To develop human and technical capacities” is an activity, not an objective, which should be defined as a desired end-state. The second sentence “it should lead to . . ….. ” is a pious hope and can't be treated as a serious formulation of an objective. The objective as currently formulated is neither specific nor measurable. Whether it can be considered attainable or not is a matter of opinion since we don't know what is expected to be attained. It is a relevant activity, but not an objective and has no time dimension.

The second objective, “to improve national capacities,” suffers from similar limitations. It is neither specific nor clearly defined. It makes no reference to what is expected to be achieved and by when. The third objective is formulated in the vaguest possible manner: “to address effectively” can't be measured at all. UNODC can claim to have achieved these objectives by making small efforts and its detractors can blame it for failures beyond its capacities and resources with equal justification. While it is true that UNODC has to operate under significant constraints, many of which are beyond its control, it doesn't imply that it needs to avoid formulating the objectives in a concrete manner to avoid blame. Instead, it needs to project its constraints and outline the objectives and outcomes for which it can be held responsible and for which it can't be held accountable.

Clearly, in terms of SMART framework, these objectives need to be reformulated, perhaps along the following lines:

(I) Human and technical capacities of governments in the region to prevent, detect and control drug-trafficking and organized crime involved in illicit drug trafficking, as a result of the assistance by UNODC, is enhanced by 20% (or any other predetermined target that all stakeholders consider feasible) every year over next three years. This reformulated objective is specific (capacity has to be enhanced), measurable (predetermined targets), achievable (targets established after negotiations among all stakeholders), relevant (addresses critical problems) and have a specific time frame or dimension. Moreover, it doesn't seek to misappropriate the increase in capacities that may occur as a result of efforts by other agencies or the regional governments themselves.

(II) National capacities to implement multi-sectoral responses to drug abuse and HIV/AIDS problems in Central Asia is enhanced as a result of UNODC assistance by a predetermined level over next 3 years. Since the drug abuse problem has grown up 7-fold in 12 years, it is apparent that the problem is acquiring critical dimensions. This implies that we need to enhance the capacity of regional governments at a rate faster than the growth of problem, which roughly is 40% per annum. If, however, UNODC can not by any means get resources sufficient to achieve these targets, the targets might need to be reduced accordingly.

(III) All countries of the region established and make use of an effective legal and institutional framework, in compliance with the respective conventions, for prevention and control of corruption, human trafficking, and terrorism in the next three years.

In the next step, we reconstruct the outcomes, performance indicators and sources of information for achievement of these objectives on the basis on our analysis of the information available in UNODC documents.

Objective: Human and technical capacities of governments in the region to prevent, detect and control drug-trafficking and organized crime involved in illicit drug trafficking, as a result of the assistance by UNODC, is enhanced by 20% every year over next 3 years.

Outcome 1: Border control of Central Asian countries neighboring Afghanistan is strengthened in terms of drugs seizures, traffickers caught and level of drugs passing through and other effective restraints on the movement of drugs and traffickers imposed.

Indicators: Amount of drugs seized, number of traffickers caught, and level of drugs that passed through undetected.

Since UNODC only has an indirect influence on the achievement of these targets, it can not be directly held accountable. However, these indicators do serve as a good proxy for estimating the increase in the capacity of member-states, assuming that the member-states are also interested in achieving these objectives. And if UNODC can show that the problem is in the intent of member-states, then the discussion shifts to a different level anyway.

However, UNODC may like to use a separate set of indicators in conjunction with these indicators. The second set of indicators would measure change in the capacity to impose effective border control by measuring pre-training and post-training levels of knowledge and capacity of the officials trained. The results can be obtained by surveys before launching a training program (to establish base), immediately after the program (to see immediate change) and 6 to 12 months later (to see long-term learning). The last of these results would be a very good proxy. If they retain their new knowledge 6 months later, the chances are that they are using it in their daily work. However, it might be a little difficult to obtain this information unless the coordinating officers among national governments are really pushed.

Source: Crime statistics and intelligence reports of regional and international organizations

Outcome 2: Core national systems for intelligence collection, collation, analysis and exchange, and a mechanism for cross-border cooperation including Central Asian Regional Information Coordination Center (CARICC) is established and utilized.

Indicators: Mechanisms established or not, Information exchanges between member-states, and results of these information exchanges.

Source: Government and multilateral documents and crime statistics

Outcome 3: The law enforcement agencies are organized, trained and utilizing the best practices in law enforcement.

Indicator: Pre and post training evaluation of the knowledge of law enforcement officials, crime statistics and convictions data

Objective: National capacities to implement multi-sectoral responses to drug abuse and HIV/AIDS problems in Central Asia, as a result of UNODC assistance, are enhanced by a predetermined level over next 3 years.

The national capacity would be enhanced if the necessary policies and programmes are designed, institutions established, people hired and trained, programs launched, beneficiaries selected and the programmed assistance initiated. Based on specific issues confronting each country, we would need to define the meaning of enhanced capacity for that country. In some cases, member-states may already have the policies in place, but may lack trained manpower to initiate the assistance to the beneficiaries. In other cases, member-states may need to be helped in determining the optimum policies and targets. As far as possible, we would advise each country office to suggest quantitative targets. At the regional office, we can combine these targets to come up with the regional quantitative targets.

Outcome 1: Governments' capacities in monitoring and evaluation is enhanced, and an integrated drug abuse information systems based on the core epidemiological indicators of the Global Assessment Programme on Drug Abuse is established.

Indicators: Monitoring and evaluation centers established, # of best practices used, pre-and post training evaluation, etc.

Source: Government documents, best practice manuals, training records, etc

Outcome 2: Best practices in prevention, treatment and rehabilitation are known to and utilized by the relevant governmental and nongovernmental staff in the region.

Indicators: Best practice manuals developed, self-reported questionnaire data, etc

Source: Government records, newspaper reports, surveys, etc. While the government records will provide us with the current status and possibly also some documentation on the practices that worked in a particular region. These records are maintained since different local or agency heads send reports to their hierarchical superiors for performance evaluation, rewards and promotions. This information will be supplemented by newspaper and other media reports. The information on international best practices will be obtained from the manuals available with other governments, international organizations and large and successful international NGOs with experience in the region.

Outcome 3: Public awareness on drug abuse and associated HIV/AIDS problem is enhanced by a pre-determined level every year.

Indicators: Level of awareness increased or not

Source: Surveys, popularity ratings of commercials and programs watched

Outcome 4: Reduction in the use of the injected drugs and the diseases related to such injection abuse

Indicators: Reduction in injected drugs occurred or not,, and reduction in mortality and other major disease rates occurred or not,

Source: Hospital records, government and NGO documents

Objective: All countries of the region established and made use of an effective legal and institutional framework, in compliance with the respective conventions, for prevention and control of corruption, human trafficking and terrorism by year 200X.

Outcome: Member-states implement and use legislation that is in conformance with the Transnational Organized Crime Convention and Protocols.

Since all the member-states have already ratified the conventions, we need to focus on getting their legislations aligned with their treaty obligations.

Indicators: Degree to which legislations confirm, cases detected, convictions according to new legislation, etc

Source: Legislative documents and crime records

Outcome: Member-states develop and use anti-corruption policies and legislations in conformance with treaties and protocols on corruption.

Indicators: Degree to which legislations confirm, cases detected, convictions according to new legislation, etc

Source: Legislative documents and crime records

Outcome: Enhanced judicial and law-enforcement integrity and capacity for reduction in corruption levels and perceptions

Indicators: Corruption perception index, public opinion, pre & post training evaluation, increased effectiveness in registration, hearing and disposal of trials, etc

Outcome: Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Combating Financing of Terrorism (CFT) laws and regulations and Financial Intelligence Units are established and used.

Indicators: Legislations implemented or not, intelligence unit established or not, cases under new laws registered and their result, etc

Source: Government records

Though we have tried to incorporate all the objectives, outcomes, and performance indicators that were apparent from UNODC documents, it is possible that some of these were left out. This is a preliminary analysis that needs to be refined and negotiated with the internal and external stakeholders of UNODC for establishing realistic targets for the organization. However, in their present formulation, the objectives, outcomes, and indicators meet the SMART criteria for strategic framework, and this exercise can be used as an illustration for strategic framework by the Central Asia office of UNODC.

In the next section, we highlight examples where the Central Asia office of UNODC has some confusion between activities or outputs and has wrongly classified these as objectives, outcomes, or performance indicators. We classify these back into the categories they belong: activities or outputs. The list is illustrative and by no means comprehensive.

Activities:

(1) To initiate a project for development of a coordination mechanism to establish a field based computerized system for the coordination of bilateral and multilateral assistance as part of the Paris Pact Initiative.

(2) To develop human and technical capacities within the Central Asian states in support of effective action to reduce trafficking by providing training, advisory missions and reports on the current situation and the best practices.

(3) To develop need based training programs.

(4) Dissemination of clear guidelines on HIV/AIDS in prisons to policy makers by sending the reports based on the WHO Guidelines and on resolutions adopted by the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

(5) Dissemination of national and regional best practices by publishing reports.

(6) Joint activities with IOM, OSCE and others on trafficking and anti-corruption programming.

(7) Training for law enforcement officials, judges and prosecutors on implementation of Global Programme against Corruption (GPAC) Toolkit.

(8) National and regional workshops on conventions.

Outputs:

(1) Increase in numbers of drug samples for analysis.

(2) Number of NGOs involved in prevention activities enhanced.

(3) Number of programs/projects formulated, implemented and evaluated.

(4) Improved and increased ARQ and BRQ reporting on drug abuse extents, patterns and trends through core epidemiological indicators, expert opinions and operational research.

(5) New partnership activities with other agencies working in control of corruption, migration and human trafficking by 2007.

(6) Acceptance and use of UNODC public service announcements on trafficking and corruption among regional media.

(7) Anti-corruption workshops conducted in region.

Thus far, we have focused on the analysis and correct formulation of the strategic framework. While we undertaking such an exercise, we hinted at the need for an alignment between objectives, outcomes, indicators, outputs and activities. We cannot stress the importance of this alignment enough. An outcome might seem very desirable and an activity very appealing, but in result-based management, they have no meaning unless they further the objectives that we have established and agreed upon. Therefore, while establishing the strategic framework, the UNODC needs to be mindful of this factor. Each outcome, each activity, and each indicator have to be well aligned with the goals being sought. Otherwise, the indicators can end up hoping for one and rewarding another outcome.

This paper has analyzed the strategic framework of Central Asia office of UNODC. As we noted earlier, Central Asia is a key region for the success of UNODC as a whole. Success will, however, come at a high price that necessitates aggressive management of regional challenges. The post-independence political, social, and economic realities on the ground include increased poverty and inequality, high levels of corruption and crime, and rampant drug abuse and unemployment. Dealing with these issues is well within UNODC’s mandate of strengthening the capacity of governments to combat these interrelated trends. An improved strategic framework for this drug trafficking region will help the UNODC in improving the capacity of the national governments to deal with the critical issues confronting them, and thereby improving the security within and across Central Asia.