International Public and NGO Management
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This week we are going to talk about the functions that take up the most money of the United Nations proper (although not of the system), based on the direct delivery of services for peace and security and humanitarian assistance. It is also the most public of the services and the most fraught with controversy. It is where risk is highest, as the situations in Iraq and the Democratic Republic of the Congo clearly show. It is the area where bad management is noticed.
In contrast to regime creation, which is largely about ideas, the function here is about tangibles: troops moved, wheat unloaded, camps constructed, wells dug, refugee applications processed.
A significant original purpose of the United Nations was to mount peace, security and humanitarian operations. This would provide short-run stability while the longer-term efforts related to development addressed the causes of war.
The delivery of these services have seen the greatest successes and the greatest failures of the United Nations in its first fifty years.
It was the area of by far greatest growth of the organization. From 8 active misions with an annual budget of about $600 million, involving about 10,000 military and 5,000 civilian personnel, at its height grew to to 29 missions with a total annual budget of over $3 billion, involving over 75,000 military and 13,000 civilians. It is still growing and, as long as the major contributors are willing to pay for it, will do so in the future. A new trend is to have a peacekeeping operation to clean up after a Chapter VII operation, as happened in Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia and now Afghanistan, and eventually also in Iraq.
It is therefore the greatest challenge for administration.
The Agenda for Peace
The basis of the current discourse derives from Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s proposals on an Agenda for Peace in 1991, whose concepts continue today, built around five activities designed to maintain international peace and security:
• Preventive diplomacy: action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur;
• Peacemaking: diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the Charter;
• Peacekeeping: a United Nations presence in the field (normally including military and civilian personnel), with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements), and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief;
• Peace-enforcement: when peaceful means fail. It consists of action under Chapter VII of the Charter, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression;
• Peace-building: identifying and supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.
These have been updated slightly by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, and have gone further since. For example, a Peacebuilding Council has been set up to work on that aspect.
I. ORIGINS OF Peace, security and humanitarian operations
A. Types of services foreseen in the Charter
Built on two conflicting aspects of realism, the Charter foresaw basically two types of peace and security operations: those collective responses to aggression set out in Chapter 7, and the good offices function of the Secretary-General.
It did not foresee what became very quickly the main type: peacekeeping; an intermediate stage between good offices and Chapter VII.
Good offices meant mediation: the United Nations or someone under its flag would seek to be neutral honest broker. The weakness was that it depended on will of the two parties and had no implementation mechanism. (Example was Count Bernadotte, who, unfortunately got in the way of terrorists and was replaced by Ralph Bunche, who won a Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating the end to the first Arab-Israeli war.)
There were 60 peace and security operations since the founding of the United Nations through 2005. Of these 39 have taken place since 1988. At the present time there are 17 operations ongoing and more in the offing, including Darfur, which may be the largest ever. You can see a timeline of these operations on the UN site (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/ ).
How they are planning and managed has evolved over time. The timeline can be seen on the UN’s peacekeeping site.
B. Early peacekeeping operations
1. UNTSO and UNMOGIP
These were among the first observer missions. They placed military observers between warring parties. These two had indefinite mandates (i.e. until the conflicts were resolved which, up to now, they haven't) and are now included in the regular budget.
2 Korea
The first, and for most of UN history, the last of the Chapter 7 events. UN troops, mostly US, under a US commander. Made possible by walkout of Security Council by Soviet Union. (USSR refused to pay any contribution to it: main item was cemetery maintenance.)
3. Middle East, Cyprus
Starting in the mid-1950’s with the Suez Crisis and continuing through the mid-1960’s, a series of operations were based on sending large bodies of troops as interposition forces between combatants. Most were completed during the 1960’s, but UNFICYP has continued to today. It has to be renewed on a six-month basis, as do most operations.
4. Common features, lessons learned
All of the operations, except Korea, were based on a simple premise that both sides accepted the mission, that it did not conflict with Superpower interests, and that it would end when a peace accord between the combatants was signed.
On the whole, the operations were simple: troop (or observer) contributing countries would be identified and troops provided, on a reimbursement basis. A minimum core civilian infrastructure would be created using "field service" staff.
Field service staff were specialists in communications, logistics and administration who could be moved from operation to operation.
The equipment needed consisted of radios, blue berets and flags. A supply depot was created in Pisa, Italy (since most of the operations were in the Mediterranean area). Ah, life was good.
In the mid-1970's, when I was stationed in Pakistan, UNMOGIP consisted of some 160 observers. All were military officers from different countries. Their commander was a Chilean general (Gen. Tassara). They spent six months in Pakistan, at an old cantonment in Rawalpindi, and six months in Srinagar. Their function was to spend time in observation posts between the two armies and ensure that no one crossed the cease-fire line. Whenever conflicts heated up, the observers, who were unarmed, were withdrawn.
C. Early multipurpose operations
In the early years of the United Nations there was only one peace operation that was at all similar to those currently undertaken. This was the Congo, and it scarred the organization for a quarter century.
1. The Congo
In 1960, the newly independent country of the Congo collapsed (the army rioted). The Congo had been one of the most ineptly governed European colonies. (At independence, there were only 7 Congolese university graduates.) The Belgians returned to restore order.
The UN operation was set up to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, but when that was accomplished, the operation had to deal with wider problems (civil war, secession (Katanga).
There were many exciting events: the murder of Lumumba, the rescue at Elizabethville of Western hostages, the Katanga Mercenaries (Rhodesians, etc.), the Italian pilots (UN personnel who were captured and murdered by mercentaries), the fighting Irish (an Irish contingent that was captured by the Katangese and were called that afterwards). Novels have been written about it (Most recently Ronan Bennett's The Catastrophist.)
For the UN it was in many ways a catastrophy:
• Problems with troops (Ghanaians and Nigerian contingents were said to have gotten involved in politics),
• Problems with definition of mission and international agreement (France and later USSR opposed, control shifted to the General Assembly) - France and USSR withheld assessments (caused first great financial crisis where USSR could have lost its vote...)
• Death of Hamarskjold
• It Stretched UN capacities to limit: new people had to be brought on board, who were not as committed to UN ideals..
2. Lessons learned
A complex operation needed adequate funding, staffing, and, most importantly political support. The latter was not forthcoming again until the last few years.
D. Early humanitarian operations
The United Nations had had humanitarian relief as a task from the beginning. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was a temporary organization set up after WWII to help rehab areas of Europe. UNRWA was set up to manage the refugee camps after the creation of Israel (it was set up as a new, if temporary, agency, because terms of reference of UNHCR did not include long-term refugee assistance..). There were many examples of operations.
The main humanitarian agencies:
• UNDP - while its charter is development, the fact that it is usually the main UN system country office means that it become involved in humanitarian operations.
• WFP - provision of food has become a central focus of humanitarian assistance and WFP has increasingly shifted from development to humanitarian assistance in response.
• UNICEF - as children are increasingly the victims of conflict, UNICEF, which also has an excellent reputation for political neutrality, has become a player in humanitarian assistance. This is aided by the fact that UNICEF primarily provides equipment and has an excellent supply operation.
• UNHCR - UNHCR was originally set up to certify refugee status, with the refugees (and their camps) being assisted by receiving and transit governments. As the refugee problem has become one of impoverished developing countries, UNHCR has increasingly had to run the camps itself and has become a major humanitarian agency.
1. UNROD
The creation of Bangladesh in the early 1970’s, after a civil war, left a new country in ruins; problem of rapes (also a place where disaster is a commonplace). The UN set up one of its first big operations there. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (the head of the operation) was Victor Umbricht, a Swiss who had worked with the Red Cross. Considerable support: e.g. Beatles’ Concert for Bangladesh. The operation is described in Thomas Oliver‘s book, the United Nations in Bangladesh, which is one of the few "insider" books on the UN. Oliver, from England, was an old hand, who had been the Chief Editor of the Economic and Social Council (I took an English drafting class from him).
2. Cambodia
After the "killing fields" period, starvation and sickness became endemic. Civil war was on. What to do? Government was unwilling to ask for help. UNICEF took a lead in bringing in assistance. William Shawcross’ book The Quality of Mercy is about this period.
3. The Sahel
In the late 1980’s, the second Sahelian drought created a famine that spread over 20-some countries in Africa, from Somalia through Senegal. Problem of providing relief. Problem of early warning. Considerable public concern, but actions were uncoordinated. This was the first era of popular music intervention (other than the Beatles' Concert for Bangladesh), including Band-Aid, Don’t they know it’s Christmas; Michael Jackson.
At the beginning of the drought, the various international and bilateral humanitarian agencies seemed to be falling all over each other. Ships were piling up in one port, while another port was empty. Equipment supplies were inconsistent and didn't always meet needs. In response, the Office of Emergency Operations in Africa was established as a temporary coordinating agency. Did not itself direct relief, mostly coordinated. It had two heads, Bradford Morse, the Administrator of UNDP and a former US Congressman, and Maurice Strong, a Canadian businessman who had run the first environmental conference. Raised money. Coordinated delivery (problem of port capacity).
A main feature was to name a representative in the field, at a higher rank who could exert coordinating authority. (The first, at Assistant Secretary-General Rank was Kurt Jansen, a Finn who was a career UN official who had risen to Director of the Social Development Division and had then moved on to UNDP where he was Resident Representative in Pakistan and Nigeria and then on to UNICEF, where he coordinated the Cambodia relief effort.)
4. Common features, lessons learned
Learned that can deliver a complex relief effort, including diversion of supplies already on way. Need for strict neutrality. Need for a top official. Need to involve all main agencies, but find a way to coordinate them.
However, the fact that there did not seem to be a constant series of need, operation of OEOA was temporary and discontinued. Instead, UNDRO (the United Nations Disaster Relief Office) was established, to provide a basis for planning, etc.
E. Finance and management of operations
A number of procedures and practices developed in both peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.
1. Troop contributing countries
A few countries became permanent contributors: Nordics, Fiji, Austrians. There was a change of reimbursement rate from actual costs to a fixed per person rate of $1000 per month that made it lucrative for some countries to participate regularly. It has become a major source of foreign exchange, for example, for Fiji, whose two-batallion army rotates between peacekeeping assignments. Some began to build peacekeeping into military training (e.g. Norway and Austria).
2. UN administrative structures
Most of the operations were controlled from the political departments, but administration was part of regular Department of Administration and Management, which included the Field Operations Division. There was an assumption that the operations were all temporary.
3. Finance
Except for UNTSO and UNMOGIP, operations were funded outside the regular budget with their own assessments. Peacekeeping accounts were regularly borrowed against during the annual cash crises... Arrears built up, but, to compensate, the operations were overbudgeted anyway and cash shortages could be handled by delaying payment to the troop contributing countries or those that leased or loaned equipment to the operations..
II. Post-cold war operations
The change in the political environment has made the UN a major actor, as has been noted. There have been a plethora of operations of all types, working in cycles.
A. Peace enforcement: Chapter 7 operations
After a hiatus of almost forty years, there have been a several. Two have been under the leadership of the United States, one by France, two by NATO and one by Australia.
1. Kuwait/Iraq
The defeat of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was undertaken by a coalition of States under the leadership of the United States in response to a Security Council resolution. The main factor was that Iraq had broken the one major political taboo of the post- WorldWar II period: Thou shall not invade a neighboring country to acquire territory.
2. Rwanda
Rwanda is classified as a Chapter 7 operation because, eventually, the French sent troops there to evacuate foreign nationals. This came on the heels of one of the most flagrant failures of UN peacekeeping. The report of an independent panel of inquiry on the situation stated:
· · The failure by the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently, to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole. The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness. This lack of political will affected the response by the Secretariat and decision-making by the Security Council, but was also evident in the recurrent difficulties to get the necessary troops for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Finally, although UNAMIR suffered from a chronic lack of resources and political priority, it must also be said that serious mistakes were made with those resources which were at the disposal of the United Nations .
Ten years afterwards, the scars -- and the lessons learned -- are still visible, as can be seen in a PBS documentary called Ghosts of Rwanda.
3. Haiti
This was a largely United States based effort, with some troop contingents from elsewhere in the region, essentially to restore an elected president and remove a coup leader. It has not been considered a success by many. It is now back in operation.
4. Bosnia
The Bosnia operation was not (and still isn't), the United Nations finest hour. The failure to act in Sebrinica was seen as a significant management failure that was bluntly documented in a report to the Security Council.
5. Kosovo
Perhaps shamed by the Bosnia situation, NATO acted quickly to intervene once the situation produced major numbers of refugees and evidence of ethnic cleansing. Subsequently, the operation was turned over to the United Nations, with some success.
6. East Timor
A recent case, where Australia was mandated to stop the fighting in this island.
7. Iraq 2003
The Iraq War was not a Chapter VII operation. In fact, by not being authorized
by the Security Council it was, in the eyes of some legal scholars, an illegitimate
use of force.
B. Straight peacekeeping
This has continued.
1. Georgia (Abkhazia)
2. Central America
C. Straight civilian human rights
A new category of peacekeeping, related to peacemaking, but involved with domestic issues that have, because of their international interest, become United Nations responsibilities.
1. Haiti
Effort to promote the implementation of the Governor’s Island Accords by monitoring violations. Not very successful. Was eventually replaced by the Chapter 7 operation.
2. Guatemala
Monitored the settlement of the internal conflict. Generally successful.
3. East Timor
D. Transitional mixed (elections + peacekeeping)
Supervision of elections was an old UN function, but in the context of decolonization and trusteeship. It has become a feature of peacekeeping. Sometimes it has been successful, sometimes not.
1. Namibia. This was probably the most successful of the post-Cold War transitional operations. It succeeded in providing for a smooth transition from South African rule to independence, with a clean and fair election and a peaceful exit for South Africa. It was headed by Maarti Ahtisaari, who later was elected president of Finland.
2. Mozambique. Similarly, this was also successful, but not as much as Namibia. Here is was a case of solving a civil war, where one side was backed by South Africa. Eventually, it succeeded.
And there have been two others that are still underway, after ten years, and cannot be counted as successes.
3. Angola
4. Western Sahara
E. Transitional mixed (peacekeeping plus humanitarian)
1. Yugoslavia
2. Rwanda
3. Afghanistan
4. Sudan (Darfur)
F. Failed state
Two operations were set up to help restore government to failed states. They were only moderately successful (Cambodia) or not successful at all.
1. Cambodia
2. Somalia
G. Problems and issues
The overriding failure in the response of the United Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized as a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide. UNAMIR, the main component of the United Nations presence in Rwanda, was not planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way which provided for a proactive and assertive role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble. The mission was smaller than the original recommendations from the field suggested. It was slow in being set up, and was beset by debilitating administrative difficulties. It lacked well-trained troops and functioning materiel. The mission’s mandate was based on an analysis of the peace process which proved erroneous, and which was never corrected despite the significant warning signs that the original mandate had become inadequate. By the time the genocide started, the mission was not functioning as a cohesive whole: in the real hours and days of deepest crisis, consistent testimony points to a lack of political leadership, lack of military capacity, severe problems of command and control and lack of coordination and discipline.
A force numbering 2,500 should have been able to stop or at least limit massacres of the kind which began in Rwanda after the plane crash which killed the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. However, the Inquiry has found that the fundamental capacity problems of UNAMIR led to the terrible and humiliating situation of a UN peacekeeping force almost paralysed in the face of a wave of some of the worst brutality humankind has seen in this century.
The main asset of the UN is its neutrality. However, in many peace operations involving internal conflict, it has proven difficult to maintain that neutrality.
Sometimes there has been a conflict between humanitarian and military: e.g. Somalia, where the Chapter VII action may have poisoned the water against the UN by making it appear that the UN was siding with a particular group of warlords..
Angola: The UN rep (Dame Margaret Anstee) was considered by UNITA not to be neutral. In fact, UNITA was not very good at living up to agreements in any case.) Dame Margaret's experience has been written in a book entitled Orphan of the Cold War.
2. Management environment
New York vs. field. Conflict between partners (e.g. UNHCR vs. UN in Yugoslavia).
3. Troop command
All troops are supposed to obey central UN. However, not always possible: US insists that its troops be under UN command. Italy, in Somalia, refused to take UN orders. The issue of accountability is related to the US insistance that its troops in peacekeeping operations be exempted from the provisions of the United Nations Criminal Court.
III. Problems of service delivery
The growth of operations exposed serious delivery problems. These have been extensively analyzed in the Secretary-General, General Assembly and in the specialized academic community.
A. Rapid response capacity
Rapid response is a problem. Movement of troops is, under any circumstances, slow: e.g. British in the Falkland/Malvinas conflict.
Decision-making process is slow: SC has to authorize; GA has to provide budget. Staff have to be recruited, troop contributions identified, equipment mobilized.
B. Staffing integrity
Growth of operations has stretched ability of using permanent staff. New staff not necessarily the same. Problems of socialization into international context. Often peacekeeping troops engaged in improper behavior.
C. Finance and procurement
Procurement had been set up based on controlled system of bidding. Speed and type of equipment needed made this difficult.
Payments into funds delayed. Problem of performance and budgeting of missions whose official life was only six (or three) months.
IV. Solutions
A. Secretariat organization: DPKO + administrative decentralization
A Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was set up to manage a large number of operations. Has two parts: policies and planning and administration. Use of support account to provide positions. (6.5% off the top on expenditures -- compare with 13% used in other accounts).
B. Training
Training of peacekeepers, development of manuals. Stress training. Establishment of behavior standards.
C. Supply stockpiling
Development of basic kits. Unit to develop communications norms. UN supply base at Brindisi. It stocks radios, berets, flags and trucks.
D. Forward planning
Situation room. Policy analysis.
Setting up standby forces in troop contributing countries. Has been moving slowly.
F. Trust Fund for Peacekeeping
Setting aside enough money to fund start-up pending approval of budget and assessment. Because of US withholdings, this never had a chance.
Perhaps the most thorough set of proposals is that made in the Brahimi report, named after the chair of the Independent Panel on Peace Operations. It recommendations state:
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
·
(a)
The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to
conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks
before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in
July 2000, in particular his appeal to "all who are engaged in conflict
prevention and development – the United Nations, the Bretton Woods
institutions, Governments and civil society organizations – [to] address these
challenges in a more integrated fashion";
(b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States’ obligations, under Article 2(5) of the Charter, to give "every assistance" to such activities of the United Nations.
(a)
A small percentage of a mission’s first-year budget should be made available to
the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading
the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the
advice of the United Nations country team’s resident coordinator;
(b)
The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other
rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to
reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and
improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments;
(c)
The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization
and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace
operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid
disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict;
(d)
The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS)
discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the
permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies
and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.
3. Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy:
Once
deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates
professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other
mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement,
against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise
seek to undermine it by violence.
4. Clear, credible and achievable mandates:
(a)
The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a
ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation,
the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such
as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of
specified tasks and timelines;
(b)
The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing
missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General
has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements,
including peace-building elements, from Member States;
(c)
Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping
operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially
the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;
(d)
The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what
it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries
that have committed military units to an operation should have access to
Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and
security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a
mission’s use of force.
5. Information and strategic analysis:
The
Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS
Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the
information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes,
it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department
of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO).
6. Transitional civil administration:
The
Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international
legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations
operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the
feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any
regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending
the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity.
7. Determining deployment timelines:
The
United Nations should define "rapid and effective deployment
capacities" as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully
deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of
a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex
peacekeeping operations.
(a)
The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission
leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential
representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force
commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies and other heads
of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and
gender distribution and with input from Member States;
(b)
The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at
Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key
aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the
mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership;
(c)
The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic
guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate
implementation, and whenever possible should formulate such guidance and plans
together with the mission leadership.
(a)
Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into
partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby
Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with
necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the
adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional
peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations;
(b)
The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member
States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops
to a potential operation, once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or
agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations, might be
reached;
(c)
The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the
preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the
memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment
requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must
not deploy;
(d)
The Panel recommends that a revolving "on-call list" of about 100
military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice to
augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission
headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation.
10. Civilian police personnel:
(a)
Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian
police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace
operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations Standby
Arrangements System;
(b)
Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for
civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of
preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and
performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations;
(c)
Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within
their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United
Nations peace operations;
(d)
The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers
and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice
with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new
peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater
coherence at an early date;
(e)
The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and
(c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant
specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial
"rule of law" teams.
(a)
The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of
pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on
short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated
authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair
geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat;
(b)
The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the
recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid- to
senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas;
(c)
Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised
to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates,
and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects;
(d)
DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations,
outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby
arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours' notice to
facilitate mission start-up, and the divisions of responsibility among the
members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that
strategy.
12. Rapidly deployable capacity for public
information:
Additional
resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the
associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation’s
message out and build effective internal communications links.
13. Logistics support and expenditure management:
(a)
The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable
rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and
corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of
DPKO;
(b)
The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to
maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include
rapidly deployable communications equipment. These start-up kits should then be
routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the
operations that drew on them;
(c)
The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US$50 million
from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, once it became clear that an operation was
likely to be established, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) but prior to the adoption of a
Security Council resolution;
(d)
The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies
and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the
Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the
rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines;
(e)
The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures
governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a
view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the
management of their budgets;
(f)
The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to
the field missions (from $200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on
mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally
and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services
contracts.
14. Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping
operations:
(a)
The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters
support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a
proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full;
(b)
Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of
the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for
this purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial
programme budget of the Organization;
(c)
Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel
recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a
request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow
immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO.
15. Integrated mission planning and support:
Integrated
Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United
Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for
mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of
contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line
authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO,
DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies.
16. Other structural adjustments in DPKO:
(a)
The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured,
moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain.
Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian
Police Adviser;
(b)
The Military Adviser’s Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more
closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations
peacekeeping operations are structured;
(c)
A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant
expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical
to the effective use of civilian police in the United Nations peace operations;
(d)
The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and
responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to
the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial
period;
(e)
The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a
revamped DPKO Office of Operations;
(f)
Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant
Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated
as the "Principal Assistant Secretary-General" and functioning as the
deputy to the Under-Secretary-General.
17. Operational support for public information:
A
unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace
operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and
Security Information Service in the Department of Public Information (DPI)
reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public
Information.
18. Peace-building support in the Department of
Political Affairs:
(a)
The Panel supports the Secretariat’s effort to create a pilot Peace-building
Unit within DPA, in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements,
and suggests that regular budgetary support for this unit be revisited by the
membership if the pilot programme works well. This programme should be
evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has provided in paragraph 46
above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United
Nations peace-building capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General
within the context of the Panel’s recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d)
above;
(b)
The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance
Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly
growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions;
(c)
To relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) and
the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to
smaller political and peace-building field offices, the Panel recommends that
procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all
such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations
Office for Project Services (UNOPS).
19. Peace operations support in the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights:
The
Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation
capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, with funding partly from the regular budget and partly from peace
operations mission budgets.
20. Peace operations and the information age:
(a)
Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to
devise and oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy
and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to
the responsibility centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices of
the special representatives of the Secretary-General in complex peace
operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy;
(b)
EISAS, in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD),
should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United
Nations Intranet and link it to the missions through a Peace Operations
Extranet (POE);
(c)
Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic
information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational
information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as
diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights
monitoring and reconstruction;
(d)
The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs,
such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more
consistently in mission planning and implementation;
(e)
The Panel encourages the development of web site co-management by Headquarters
and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but
individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content
that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy.
*****
V. Humanitarian operations
These are subject to many of the same problems, but because they are built on permanent agencies with consistent structures, have had fewer problems. There has been a defacto division of labor: for immediate relief, use the International Committee of the Red Cross, for refugee situations (defined as transborder movements) lead is usually UNHCR, for displaced situations (non-transborder), lead can be WFP or UNICEF. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator becomes responsible for consolidated fund appeals. You can see some of the problems with this by reading the evaluation reports produced by UNHCR.
New problems include perceived lack of neutrality of humanitarian personnel, increasing danger in work (e.g. UNICEF and WFP casualties in Burundi), problems in obtaining enough funds to cover expanding functions.
Need to coordinate with NGOs.
VI. Role of NGO's
As can be seen from l999's Nobel Peace Prize to the NGOs that successfully advocated for the Land Mines Convention, NGO's are taking on an increasingly visible role (they have always been involved as relief agencies). Medicins sans Frontieres have been particularly notable in that they ignore political issues as well as security concerns and tend to be the last ones to stay.
The problem is often one of co-ordination. NGO's do not like to cede their autonomy and yet, to obtain a coherent response to emergencies, need to pool efforts.
NGO's need to demonstrate to their donors that they, as individual organizations, are effective. Means they need to have an identifiable role.
NGO's are often staffed by persons of fewer nationalities than international public agencies.
An unresolved question is how to overcome these issues in a generic sense, although in specific operations the problems can be overcome by good management on the part of whoever is given the international lead.
©2003-2004. John R. Mathiason. All Rights Reserved.
Last modified: October 6, 2007