Authoritarianism in the Hypermasculinized State: Hybridity, Patriarchy, and Capitalism in Korea

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Authoritarianism in East Asia’s capitalist developmental state (CDS) is highly gendered. A hybrid product of Western masculinist capitalism and Confucian parental governance, CDS authoritarianism takes on a hypermasculinized developmentalism that assumes all the rights and privileges of classical Confucian patriarchy for the state while assigning to society the characteristics of classical Confucian womanhood: diligence, discipline, and deference. Society subsequently bears the burden of economic development without equal access to political representation or voice. Women in the CDS now face three tiers of patriarchal authority and exploitation: family, state, and economy. Nevertheless, new opportunities for democratization may arise even in the hypermasculinized state. We suggest: (1) emphasizing substantive, not just procedural, democratization, (2) exercising a maternalized discourse of dissent, and (3) applying hybrid strategies of social mobilization across states, societies, cultures, and movements. South Korea during the 1960s–1970s serves as our case study.

Analyses of authoritarianism in East Asia’s “capitalist developmental state” (CDS) often turn on an either-or proposition. Liberals note its historical legacy of “Oriental despotism,” thereby recommending cultural conversion or institutional reform to attain democracy. Critical theorists view CDS authoritarianism as a function of dependent capitalist development. This leads them to advocate structural de-linking or counter-hegemonic movements for local emancipation. This conceptual fundamentalism not only produces impractical strategies for democratization but is also historically inaccurate. Liberals presume that Confucian hegemony transcends time and space, while critical theorists posit that capitalism consumes all that lies in its path. At root lies a common, more profound belief: “East vs. West.” This dichotomy
essentializes, radicalizes, and objectifies both “East” and “West.” At the same time, it relieves each hegemonic order of its complicity in co-producing authoritarianism in our modern era.

The CDS, we propose, is one such product. It converges Western masculinist capitalism with Confucian parental governance. A hybrid “hypermasculinized” state results that glorifies aggression, achievement, control, competition, and power in the name of national reconstruction. But the burden of sustaining hypermasculinity falls primarily on society. Previously considered the Confucian parent-state’s childlike dependent, it is now recast in the role of the classical Confucian daughter-wife: submissive, disciplined, hard-working, and self-sacrificing. Women in the CDS now face three tiers of patriarchal authority and exploitation: family, state, and economy. Additionally, both society and women must earn “hard” currency promised by multinational corporations and their military auxiliaries. But, as this article will show, new opportunities for democratization may arise even in the hypermasculinized state.

We begin by defining the CDS and common understandings of its authoritarianism. Finding these normatively and epistemologically Orientalist, we turn to recent postcolonial and feminist critiques. They provide an analytical guideline that traces CDS authoritarianism to its hybrid origins. From this basis, we discover a need for: (1) substantive, not just procedural, democracy, (2) a maternalized discourse for social action and dissent, and (3) hybrid strategies that draw on the strength and resilience of disparate social movements across states, societies, and cultures.

This article focuses on South Korea (hereafter Korea) during Park Chung Hee’s regime (1961–1979). Its legacy of Confucianism, reputation as a “hard” state, and record of rapid economic growth exemplifies the East Asian CDS (cf. Koo and Kim, 1992). Furthermore, the Korean polity is undergoing radical changes with its transition to a civilian government in 1987 and prosecution of former presidents for corruption in 1996. Thus Korea serves as an instructive case for examining the origin, nature, and course of authoritarianism in East Asia’s CDS.

Authoritarianism and the Capitalist Developmental State

Defining the CDS

The CDS refers to East Asia’s Confucian-capitalist economies—Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Institutionally and ideologically committed to capitalist economic development, they experienced rapid growth in the 1960s–1970s. Hong Kong qualifies conditionally as a CDS, given its previous administration by a British...
colonial, rather than indigenous, government. But now Hong Kong has merged
with the region's next CDS: a Confucian-socialist China bent on capitalist accumu-
lation (Ling, 1996). The CDS model thus encompasses a vast territory rich with local
histories, cultures, languages, ethnicities, and developmental aspirations. Some
argue against compressing all these differences into a single model of development
given the region’s diversity (Chu, 1989; Perkins, 1994; Douglass, 1994). Ling (1988),
however, finds three characteristics common to all the CDS but initially identified
for European corporatist states:

1. Tri-partite decision-making structure. As with European corporatist states,
the CDS relies on a tripartite decision-making structure. Instead of labor, the CDS
has “monopolies of representation” interacting with state and capital (Lijphart,
1975; Newman, 1981; Cawson, 1986). These come in the form of enterprise groups
and trade associations. Labor unions in the CDS, in contrast, are prohibited from
organizing through legal sanctions, enterprise-level controls, and/or high transac-
tions costs (Tan, 1984; Deyo, 1987; Johnson, 1987; Zeigler, 1988).

2. Institutionalized interest groups. “Monopolies of representation” institu-
tionalize domestic interest groups in European corporatist states (Berger, 1981;
Schmitter, 1982; Grant, 1985). These quasi-autonomous, semi-governmental
organizations are hierarchical in nature and subordinate/coordinate the activities of
whole economic sectors and social classes (Newman, 1981). In the CDS, the
monopolies of representation exhibit a high degree of functional and institutional
integration such as backward and forward linkages through subcontractual rela-
tions, joint investments, and/or central financing through interlocking banking
networks (Friedman, 1988; Kosaka, 1985; Zysman, 1983; Hayden, 1982).

3. Insular national bureaucracy. European corporatist states retain “relative
autonomy” from private interests by institutionalizing certain interest groups
(Schmitter, 1982). The national bureaucracies of Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan enjoy a similar insularity in decision-making. Each decides the eco-
nomic horizon for “sunrise” or “sunset” industries, and allocates resources accord-
ingly. Although there is considerable consultation between state and firms, these
governmental agencies often supersede the demands of domestic interest groups
(Haggard and Moon, 1983).

A critical difference between Asian and European corporatism, though, lies in the
role of the state. European corporatist states are “indirectly rather than directly
interventionist”; they make national policy “in conjunction” with the above-men-
tioned monopolies of representation “based on a division of labour in society”
(Grant, 1985). The CDS also applies macro-economic management through such
measures as favorable licenses, loan incentives, tax exemptions, and financial
subsidies to regulate economic growth (Gold, 1986; Johnson, 1987). But it com-
mands greater political and cultural authority in national decision-making than its
European counterpart. Identified as “plan rational” (Appelbaum and Henderson,
1992), the CDS oversees a “governed market” (Wade, 1990). For example, it restricts
foreign investments to specific industries such as electronics, or to geographical

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5 For example, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the
Economic Planning Agency.
6 For example, the Economic Development Board.
7 For example, the Economic Planning Board.
8 For example, the Council for Economic Planning and Development.
9 Given this differentiation, we do not consider the European corporatist state to be authoritarian in the same way
as the CDS. Nevertheless, the corporatist model remains analytically useful for identifying commonalities across East
Asia’s various CDS.
locations such as export-processing zones (Haggard and Cheng, 1987). The CDS also counters foreign competition with nontariff barriers (e.g., cultural idiosyncrasies) at home and, for overseas markets, structural assistance such as government-business “liaisons” to conduct market research, purchase resources, negotiate deals (especially with other national governments), and/or reduce transactions costs (e.g., establishing flight routes with the national airline to access new markets).

Central to the CDS is a catch-up ideology. Meiji Japan rallied its first industrialization effort in the late 1860s to prevent colonization by invading foreigners. Postwar Japan embarked on a second round of industrialization to placate unrest at home and geopolitical concerns abroad. Singapore mobilized economic development by drawing on anti-colonialist sentiments against Britain as well as anti-Chinese prejudice from the Malaysian federation. South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong motivated their rapid growth under the banner of anti-communism.

Each CDS, accordingly, nurtures a depoliticized, techno-rational, bourgeois elite. The CDS offers a social contract of sorts: political exclusion for economic accumulation. An education-intensive program reinforces this highly competitive, economically oriented but politically docile managerial class (Dore, 1965; Rohlen, 1983). Some contend that this social contract no longer holds since many advocates of democratization in the CDS come from this class of social and economic elites. Others, though, question how democratically inclined this class can be given its vested interests in the state (Brown and Jones, 1995; Kim, 1993).

For these reasons, many associate an inherent authoritarianism with the CDS. They cite its legacy of despotic rule usually led by a Confucian technocratic elite (“they care not for democracy”) combined with the exigencies of capitalist economic development (“authoritarianism is more efficient”) to produce a variety of strong states: for example, “catch-up” fascism in prewar Japan (Landes, 1965); “bureaucratic-authoritarianism” in Korea (Koo, 1987; Im, 1987); “soft authoritarianism” in Singapore (Denny, 1994; Jones, 1994); etatism in Taiwan (Gold, 1986; Amsden, 1985, 1979); and now suggestions of “neo-authoritarianism” in China (Petracca and Xiong, 1990).

“East vs. West”

At root lies a presumed dichotomy: Western masculinist capitalism versus Confucian parental governance. Pye’s (1985) analysis of Asian power and culture serves as a classic example. Contra Weber (1951), Pye concedes that elements of Confucianism may promote capitalist economic development. He acknowledges that different Confucian societies may vary in their interpretations and applications of Confucianism. Nevertheless, Pye echoes Weber in asserting an “Oriental despotism” for all Asian, especially Confucian, societies. “They share,” he writes (1985:vii), “the common denominator of idealizing benevolent, paternalistic leadership and of legitimizing dependency.” Throughout, Pye contrasts Confucian authoritarianism with the norms of Western liberal capitalism. Where the West prizes “autonomy” and “individual identity,” Asians desire “personal security” in the form of a childlike dependency. Where the West defines power as “participation,” Asians view it as the epitome of non-decision-making. Where the West seeks choice, Asians want just the opposite. Pye concludes that Asians will always lag behind on the democratization track because, at heart, they yearn for order and security proffered by the twin compact of authoritarianism and dependency.

10 For a comparison of East Asian capitalist authoritarianism with other types of repressive regimes in the Third World see Feith, 1981.
Defenders of Confucianism also contribute to this East-West essentialism. Tai (1989), for example, claims that the CDS succeeded in capitalist development due to such Confucian traits as harmony, patronage, this-worldly traditions, and “feelings.” These contrast with the West’s dynamism, individualism, other-worldly religions, and rationality. Kahn (1979) identifies a “Confucian ethic” built on “hierarchy,” “discipline,” “control,” and “motivation” that will defeat the West in economic competition, given the latter’s excessive “egalitarianism,” “rivalry,” “payoffs,” and “self-indulgence.” Some extend this Confucianization of modernization to democratization. Advocates of an “Asian-style” democracy cite the Mandate of Heaven as an arbiter of good governance. That is, the people have a right to rebel if the state violates their trust. They also refer to classical texts like the Minben Zhengchi. It teaches officials to respect the will of the people “as heaven itself.” Indeed, Kim (1994:191) suggests, Confucianism offers the potential for developing democracy “even beyond the level of the West.”

Studies of the CDS in international context share this dichotomous orientation. Liberal internationalists advise a deepening of Western capitalism in the CDS to preserve what little ground it has gained in democratization (cf. Cotton, 1989; Cheng, 1989; Billet, 1990; Berry and Kiely, 1993). Even scholars without an explicit political agenda indirectly conform to this dichotomy by noting how the region competes against the West through institutional and ideological linkages forged during Japan’s colonization of the region (Cumings, 1984; Bernard and Ravenhill, 1995). Cumings (1988), for example, acknowledges the impact of global capital on state authoritarianism in Northeast Asia. But he still maintains that it founts from “the first half of the twentieth century, where strong colonial states administratively guided development, where the state structure was bequeathed mostly intact in 1945, and where the particular model of the state’s role in development could be revived and used by both Korea and Taiwan” (Cumings, 1988:269).

Critical theorists, on the other hand, view CDS authoritarianism as a function of Western masculinist capitalism. Dependency theorists, world system theorists, and Gramscian globalists alike regard the CDS, respectively, as “dependent development,” a “semi-periphery,” or “transmission belt” for core interests in the Western-led, capitalist-defined world economy (cf. Bollen, 1983). The success of East Asia’s CDS, writes Cox (1987:232), is “conditional upon” foreign capital, technology, and “the principal determinants of the direction of development, i.e., decisions about what is to be produced and for which markets.” Subsequent institutional developments—for example, the emergence of a petit bourgeoisie, enterprise corporatism, state-controlled labor unions—merely reflect local responses to global needs.

A notable exception is Koo’s (1987) dialectical model of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Korea. Utilizing a world system perspective, he identifies two critical stages to Korea’s integration into the capitalist world economy: the first under Japanese colonization; the second, U.S. hegemony. In both stages, the state, social classes, and the capitalist world system mutually reconstruct to produce an authoritarian regime justified by rapid economic development.

Nevertheless, liberals and critical theorists agree: East and West do not meet. Liberals decree that democratization means, in essence, a conversion to Western masculinist capitalism. That is, the West should lead the rest. Critical theorists may denounce Western masculinist capitalism as another kind of hegemony but they still assign to it a structural/ideological supremacy denied to non-Western traditions like Confucianism. That is, the West acts alone. It absorbs, if not obliterates, pre-capitalist forms of production, consumption, and hegemony. Indeed, Gills (1993:200)

11 Cox tempers this epistemic centrism by theorizing that ideas, institutions, and social forces interplay at both local and global levels to produce dialectical change in world order. He emphasizes that we need to “avoi[d] the illusion of
outrightly dismisses the two-millennia-old Chinese world order as irrelevant, non-existent, or, at best, “misplaced” when compared with the contemporary world hegemony of Western masculinist capitalism. Even Koo’s model grants an implicit power to global capital by asserting its ability to transform local processes.\textsuperscript{12}

In sum, liberals and critical theorists alike assign to Western masculinist capitalism a normative and epistemological agency that they deny to Confucian parental governance. Normatively, they see capitalism as revolutionary, individualist, rational, and universal. Epistemologically, it is active, articulate, standard-bearing, and super-real. Confucianism, by contrast, is seen as just the opposite. Normatively, it is conservative, collectivist, affective, and ethnocentric. Epistemologically, it is passive, mute, flexible, or nonexistent. At most, Confucianism may be granted a certain cleverness in coping with the West. But it remains reactionary compared to the West’s exciting, generative powers. There is, in short, no countervailing force to check, modify, transform, or even interact with the West.

This stance toward the CDS does not spring from an intellectual vacuum. It reflects an older, more entrenched tradition toward Asia by the West. Edward Said calls it “Orientalism.”

### Orientalizing the CDS

Orientalism, writes Said (1979), involves a projection of the Other as fantasized by the West. Orientalism begins with the premise that the Western Self exemplifies all the virtues and achievements of the Enlightenment: for example, reason, science, progress, universality, beauty, and truth. The Other, in contrast, is the Western Self’s negation: irrational, superstitious, backward, parochial, ugly, and deceptive. More than mere symbolism, this projection reflects and sustains unequal power relations: “The Orient was Orientalized,” notes Said (1979:6), “not only because it was discovered to be ‘Oriental’ . . . but also because it could be—that is, submitted to being—made Oriental [original emphasis].” To rationalize this power disparity, Orientalism disseminates, legitimates, and sustains its construction of the Other through popular and scientific knowledge (Said, 1994). Here, Said credits Gramsci’s notion of hegemony as a product of both coercion and consent. Innocuously generative, Orientalism may be internalized and naturalized by the Other. Indeed, the colonized often chills to the realization that the “enemy,” more often than not, exists within (cf. Fanon, 1963; Memmi, 1965; Parry, 1987; Bhabha, 1987; Feuchtwang, 1987).

Orientalism takes on gender and racial overtones as well. To Orientalists, biology like culture is immutable. This Orientalist attitude, writes Said (1979:70), “shares with magic and with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system, in which objects are what they are because they are what they are, for once, for all time, for ontological reasons that no empirical material can either dislodge or alter.” Here, the body cites a constant reminder of what the Other is not and could never be: white, bourgeois, and masculine. As a black man, Fanon observes, he is “overdetermined from without” due not to the “idea” of a slave that others have of him but to his own, inescapable appearance (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1995:325). To a woman of color, adds Suleri (1992:761), the body and lived

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\textsuperscript{12} This hidden Orientalism is not surprising given Koo’s intellectual anchor in Marxism. Note, for example, how revolutionary Marx reminds disappointingly of bourgeois Hegel when dismissing “Oriental despotism” as “restrain[ing],” “enslaving,” and “depriving” (Tucker, 1972:582). Hegel, in turn, finds no dialectics in the non-Western Other. Referring to Africa, he finds that it is “compressed within itself,” forming an “Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature [original emphasis]” (Hegel quoted in Lamming, 1995:15).
experience allow Orientalist discourse to “rehears[e] the objectification of its proper subject.” Herein lies the purpose of genderizing and racializing the Other: that is, to sexualize the relationship between a masculinized, dominant West and its feminized, subordinated Other. Toward this end, Said (1979:87) concludes, the West regards the Other as a spatial/cultural “womb” from which to spawn future civilizations in its image.

Postcolonial theory challenges this Orientalist presumption of Self vs. Other. Long experienced with the culture-mixing, language-jumping, identity-shifting, and power-negotiating residues of imperialism, postcolonial theory recognizes hybridity and multiplicity as key dynamics to our contemporary world. Often, the postcolonial subject embodies the “carnivalesque” and “contrapuntal” effects of imperialism given the colonizers’ sexual prerogatives in the field (Hyam, 1992). Assertions of singularity, coherence, or self-enclosure in identity merely distort or suppress the “hybridity,” “simulacra,” and “mimicry” that daily manifest in global life (Bhabha, 1995). Given this personal, almost “promiscuous” exchange between colonizer and colonized, the postcolonial subject is able to “mobilize[e] not just a single ‘identity’ but several fluid identities which, by their very nature, must be constantly ‘revised’ in order to achieve maximum instrumentality and efficacy as and when required” (Mbeembe, 1992:5). For this reason, postcoloniality is open ended, organic, and innovative. It suggests a condition of constant change rather than stasis. “Fundamentally fractal” (Appadurai, 1990), it defies easy containment for control or prediction purposes. When cross-fertilization occurs, we can anticipate neither its nature, content, nor outcome.

Feminism adds an additional sensibility to postcolonial theory. It foregrounds the gendered consequences to local-global interactions within a context of colonialism and imperialism. This concept of gender extends beyond biological “men” and “women” to include socialization processes of masculinization and feminization that legitimate hegemony. Nandy (1988), for instance, traces the initial feminization of India by British colonialism through a war-mongering, territory-grabbing hyper-masculinity. To him, Gandhi effectively undermined British imperial manhood by revalorizing a traditional, Hindic formulation that finds the feminine-within-the-masculine. In this way, Gandhi re-aligns an independent India with a masculinized nonviolence and British imperial control with a hypermasculinized “underdeveloped heart.” Feminist theorizing in postcolonial studies also highlights one subject usually absent in both imperialist and anti-imperialist contestations: the Female Other. She loses the ability to “speak,” observes Spivak (1988), when crushed between a masculinist, imperialist Western Self and its equally masculinist, reactionary Male Other.

More generally, feminist theorizing in international relations explores linkages between gender, race, and patriarchy within the Western Self. Drawing on Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989), McClintock (1993:65) demonstrates how the Western nation-state historically uses the concept of “woman” to consolidate nationalist, imperialist goals: “A woman’s political relation to the nation was submerged as a social relation to a man through marriage [original emphases].” Britain’s imperialist projects overseas even “gendered time” by constructing women and their counterparts, the colonized and working classes, as “aachronistic humans, childlike, irrational and regressive”; whereas, middle class, white men embodied the forward-thrusting agency of national ‘progress’ ” (McClintock, 1993:67). Yet, as Elshtain (1992:149) observes, the nation-state also propagated a discourse of sacrifice that equates a man’s death on the battlefield with a mother’s loss of sons in war: “[T]he nation is home and home is mother.” Similarly, the state stratified race and gender

13 For a review and critique of hybridity in postcoloniality see Dirlik, 1994.
in foreign policy. White women were idealized as home and hearth to the Western state; whereas men and women of color symbolized its objects of conquest, conversion, or simply inferiority (Hunt, 1987). These internalized constructions of nation-state as patriarchal plantation relations configured by race, gender, class, and power externalized easily into a discourse of masculine West and feminine Asia.

“Masculine West, Feminine Asia”

Three interrelated discourses in the West Orientalize East Asia: the “opening of Asia,” modernization theory, and Cold War politics. They project onto Asia the traditional parent-child metaphor of colonial politics. But they also assign to the region a feminized status that varies between innocent young maiden (e.g., postwar Korea) and demon bitch goddess (e.g., “Vietcong,” “Red China”). In either case, they sustain an image of the West as Asia’s masculine savior.

From the mid eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, European and American imperialists argued for an “opening” of East Asia to rationalize their colonizing objectives in the region. Asia “experts” later institutionalized this ideology by portraying the region as dormant, isolated, and backward (cf. Cohen, 1984). This underlying imagery of surging conquest, if not rape, prevails today. Note how this contemporary volume on Korea characterizes its initial contact with the West as a confrontation between shy, protected Asian exotica and unstoppable, raw Western adventurism:

For a century and a half after the West began its penetration into the East, Korea’s Confucian monarchy and aristocracy held modernity at bay through an isolationism so strict that the peninsula came to be called the Hermit Kingdom. (Oliver, 1993:17)

Indeed, Western analysts tend to attribute any change in modern East Asia to the masculinist, “penetrative” powers of the West. For one author, postwar political instability in the region—for example, civil wars, ideological revolutions, and other social movements—stemmed from dangerous passions aroused in Asia by the West, sometimes due to an incomplete penetration:

We need not be surprised by the fact of social revolution in Asia, for we—the United States and our colleagues of the western world—started it. It was our trade and later our western technology which broke down the Oriental economies and social systems, though in most cases it failed to penetrate them deeply [our emphasis]. (Cleveland, 1949:25)

During the Cold War years, modernization theory aligned free-market capitalism with a U.S.-led liberal internationalism. This nineteenth-century discourse of modernism, notes Manzo (1991:6), “treats the individual nation-state in the Third World as the sovereign subject of development, and... accepts the Western model of national autonomy with growth as the appropriate one to emulate... [Thus the Western state becomes] analogous with ‘reasoning man’ at the center of modernity, and the relationship between core/peripheral or modern/traditional states as implicitly akin to that between parent and child” (Manzo, 1991:6).

Indeed, Herman Kahn, Cold War warrior and modernization advocate, analogizes global economic competition and political leadership to that manly sport of kings: hunting. It instills all those qualities needed for winning in world politics: “responsibility, self-reliance, and mature behavior” (Kahn, 1979:478). Indeed, Kahn (1979:474–6) insists,
States dependent on U.S. aid or security are particularly susceptible to this discourse of white, hegemonic manhood. Political cartoons of U.S. relations with Latin America typically portray the former as “Uncle Sam” helping the latter, drawn as a “Little Sambo” or a maiden in distress (Johnson, 1980). Similarly, Asian states after World War II are characterized as sickly or helpless children. In recommending policy for Korea’s economic development after the Korean War, for example, an American analyst characterized the U.S. as “somewhat in the position of a man, who, never before having tried a more ambitious water sport than wading, has suddenly plunged into deep water to save a drowning child” (Lewis, 1955:47). U.S. involvement in Vietnam intensifies and complicates this sexual politics, especially when American “techno-muscularity” (Boose, 1993) fails to win the war but sires, instead, a whole generation of AmerAsian dependents. Neither are Western white women immune to this sexual imagery, as demonstrated by inverted fantasies of seduction/rape by “exotic” men (Donaldson, 1992).

Cultural productions popularize this notion of masculine West and feminine Asia. Hollywood consistently casts Asia as a dangerous, perhaps fatal, seduction. The silent era of the 1920s gave us the fascinating but evil Dr. Fu Manchu. The 1930s–1950s romanticized the good but oppressed Asian as embodied in the female peasant (“The Good Earth”), the female prostitute (“The World of Suzie Wong”), the female artist (“Sayonara”), the female intellectual (“Love Is a Many Splendored Thing”). Conversely, we had the cognitively agile but physically asexual Charlie Chan during this period. The 1960s–1970s reflected a Cold War patriarchal ideology usually with masculine West saving feminine Asia from disease (“The Geisha and the Cowboy”), warlords (“55 Days in Peking”), and communists (“The Green Berets”). In the reactionary 1980s–1990s, a string of white he-men vowed to avenge their manhood somehow lost in—or to—Asia (e.g., Rambo series, “Black Rain,” “Rising Sun”) (cf. Jeffords, 1989). Today, a running hit on Broadway, “Miss Saigon,” recycles for a new generation of cultural consumers the tragedy of an Asian prostitute abandoned by her white American lover. The sheer number of these productions outflank those that aim for a more complex, contextualized understanding of East-West relations (e.g., “Mississippi Massala,” “M. Butterfly”).

Even a cultural interpreter as astute and learned as Roland Barthes implicitly subscribes to this notion of masculine West/feminine Asia. Note how he describes the use of chopsticks. They “pinch,” “raise,” “select[ing],” “turn[ing],” “shif[t],” “divide,” “separate,” “part,” “peck,” and “transfer.” In contrast, the Western knife-and-fork “cut,” “pierce,” “mutilate,” “trip,” and “violate” (Barthes, 1982:17–8). Consummately “maternal,” Barthes (1982:18) writes, chopsticks “tirelessly perform the gesture which creates the mouthful, leaving to our alimentary manners, armed with pikes and knives, that of predation.”

In this way, the West doubly feminizes the Asian Other. First, the Other is emasculated by its lack of industrial/democratic/Western manhood. Secondly, the Other is exiled and prostituted through its women. Scott (1995:39) notes that just

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14 With Vietnam’s return to the capitalist world economy, the U.S. is reviving a masculinist discourse for its economic development. The New York Times, for example, describes Hanoi as “dour,” “stultifying,” and “lifeless” until it receives regenerative infusions of capital, technology, and “know-how” through “normalized” U.S.-Vietnamese relations (Sanger, 1995:A3:1).
as modernization in the Third World is identified with “self-propelled men [who] leave the household, abandon tradition, and assume their rightful place among other rational men [so, too] women and the household are conceived of as part of the past that contains the dangerous worldview that nature is unalterable and that man is powerless in his efforts to control it.” Consequently, modernization theory consistently defines “development” as a progression of the modern/objec-
tive/male/West away from the traditional/natural/female/Other (cf. Mies, Bennholdt-
Thomsen, and von Werlhof, 1988). At the same time, modernization theory and Cold War politics often use the female Other to facilitate its “penetration” by the West. Enloe (1989:124) demonstrates how Carmen Miranda’s act as the Chiquita Banana Girl of the 1950s “helped make Latin America safe for American banana companies at a time when U.S. imperialism was coming under wider regional criticism.” Enloe also points to the inflation of “entertainment businesses” around U.S. military bases where poor, illiterate, young women are marketed in exchange for their “protection” by the very men who exploit them.15

Not all Orientalizing, however, comes from without. “Orientalized Orientals” (Soguk, 1993) defy the West with promotions of local traditions that end up masking and reifying internal inequities. In her study of Taiwanese family firms, Greenhalgh (1994) finds that “Confucian tradition” often rationalizes discrepancies in resource and prestige allocation according to age, gender, and kinship. Younger daughters-in-law in the family firm, for instance, invariably find themselves with the worst jobs at the lowest pay.

**A Postcolonial-Feminist Approach**

These postcolonial and feminist critiques suggest an analytical guideline for studying authoritarianism in the CDS:

- We must examine Confucian hegemony on its own terms, rather than filtering it through the Orientalizing lens of the West;
- To understand how local and global forces co-produce the “modernity that characterizes the present epoch” (Krishna, 1993:387), we trace the interaction between Western masculinist capitalism and Confucian hegemony;
- To access local internalizations of Orientalism, we juxtapose hegemonic propagations of “knowledge”—e.g., economic development—with constructions of “desire”—e.g., national sovereignty, state power, economic wealth;
- Lastly, we evaluate the resulting nature of authoritarianism in the CDS.

Let us begin with the Asian Other in its own context as Self.

**The Other as Self: Confucian Parental Governance**

[It is not the case that a man can fail in instilling good principles into his own family and, at the same time, succeed in instilling those principles into men outside it. Thus it is that a true man without going outside his family brings good principles into being throughout the country—The Great Learning (12 B.C.)]

In the Confucian world order, officials are the fathers and mothers (fumu guan) of the people. The people, in turn, are their filial children-subjects. The Analects instructs the state to “act as if you were watching over an infant” (Grazia, 1973:205).

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15 Neither does critical international political economy in the form of dependency theory offer relief from this overweening Westernization and masculinization. See, for example, Manzo, 1991.
The Ritual Records (12 B.C.) note that “the happy and gracious sovereign is the father and mother of the people” (Book 26:1); even Laozi (6 B.C.), the Daoist advocate of “do nothing” (wu wei), advocates the state to regard the people as “a child” (Thomas, 1968:42, 163). In the Book of Documents (12 B.C.), the role of parent and state is imbued with universal, almost divine, authority: “Heaven and earth are parent of all creatures. Sincerity and wisdom become the sovereign; for he is the parent of the people” (Thomas, 1968:163, 283). Mencius (c.372–c.289 B.C.) teaches that “no benevolent man ever abandons his parents, and no dutiful man ever puts his prince last” (Book I of Mengzi quoted in Grazia, 1973:131).

International relations thus consists not of evolutionary competition among equals, as preached by the West. Rather, the Confucian world order conceives of international relations as a set of ritualized superior-subordinate relations grounded in the extended family. (Confucius asks in the Analects, “How can a state be established if no distinction is made between superiors and inferiors?”) Just as “[t]he correct place of the woman is within; the correct place of the man is without” (Book of Changes quoted in Grazia, 1973:10, 81), so “the interest of the wise ruler lies in carrying out what makes for order among the people and avoiding what makes for confusion” (Mozi quoted in Grazia, 1973:227). For this reason, Confucian governance upholds the “three bonds” (san gang) of superior-subordinate relations: ruler to subject, father to son, and husband to wife. By extension, those in closest conformity to the Confucian ideal—for example, China, Korea—command greater civilizational seniority. Those furthest away—for example, Japan, Europe—are peripheralized as “barbaric,” “primitive,” or “immature.”

Given this vision of concentric hierarchical relations, Confucianists treated the West as a wild child who needed greater socialization. When European states demanded access to China’s riches in teas, silks, and other commodities, the Celestial Empire responded as a traditional parent: the West may, if it so wished, join China’s tributary system. That is, it may “enroll as tributaries, accept investiture, send envoys to perform the kowtow (three kneelings and nine prostrations) before the Son of Heaven, and otherwise obey the regulations for tributary intercourse” (Teng and Fairbank, 1979:18–9). But it could not, under any circumstances, entertain notions of equality or mutual respect. Table 1 summarizes the contending principles of Western masculinist capitalism and Confucian parental governance. As the next section will show, Korea is heir—and victim—to both hegemonic orders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Masculinist Capitalism</th>
<th>Confucian Parental Governance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Western “penetration,” Asian “opening”</td>
<td>Confucian benevolence, Western filiality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evolutionary competition among equals (“self-help”)</td>
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<td>West as model, Asia as follower</td>
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<td>Capitalist democracy vs. totalitarian or authoritarian Other</td>
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<tr>
<th>Underlying Gender Images</th>
<th>Masculine West</th>
<th>Feminine Asia</th>
<th>Mother-Father Asia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Moral</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Unreliable</td>
<td>Authoritative</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conquering</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>Junior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Backward</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Greedy</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
By the end of World War II, the Korean people were keenly aware of their rape and exploitation by outside powers. Not only had they suffered Japanese colonization for almost half a century (1910–1945), they had to contend with a postwar American paternalism that exacerbated a devastating civil war (1950–1953) (Cumings, 1981). Hence, a dominant image of man in postwar Korean literature was the “walking wounded.” His body and soul “deprived[d], distort[ed], destroy[ed], and . . . pulverize[d]” by the war, the walking wounded passed through life as victims of history (Kim, 1978:13).

With his military coup of 1961, Park Chung Hee sought to counter this national anomie by appropriating Western masculinist capitalism. He derided Korea’s emasculated status by citing an old Korean folksong. It tells of a cuckolded husband who, upon finding his wife with another man, simply moans, “What am I to do? What am I to do?” If he were a Western man, Park retorted, he would shoot them with a pistol! Alas, Park sighed, “how good and gentle (i.e., passive) are our forefathers!” (Park, 1969:95). Park’s avenging pistol came in the form of hypermasculinized economic development. He rallied society to vindicate Korea’s subjugation within a Hobbesian world of economic competition: “Let’s Fight and Construct!” (ssaumyu geonseolhaja!) “Export is the Only Way to Survive” (soochoolmani salgida da), “Exports as Total War” (soochool chongryukjeon), and “Trade as War!” (mooyukjeon-jaeng!). The Park regime referred to workers as industrial or export “soldiers” (saneob or soochool jonsa).16

But first, he asked, “How can we export and construct without political stability?” (Park, 1969:268). Toward this end, he hailed the “manliness” of his regime: it was masculine, purposeful, and the people’s savior. Park constantly emphasized “the strength of the state” (kookryuk) and its need to “regenerate the nation” (minjok joongheung). In contrast, all previous regimes were effete, ineffective, and humiliating. Note, for example, this untitled poem by Park (1969:826) written in the 1960s:

Work hard and sweat!
The whirring of the machines
Reverberates like music.
Young girl
In a second-class carriage
Reading French poems
To me, your
Tender hands
Are undesirable.
We have to work.
Beautiful hands, through you
We have become poor and exploited.
Although the young girl’s beautiful hands aren’t ugly,
Beautiful hands are our enemy.17

Park’s exhortation to “work hard and sweat” contrasts with his veiled reference to previous leaders as a “young girl” with her “tender (i.e., spoiled) hands.” This includes the king and aristocracy from the Yi Dynasty (1392–1910) as well as the leaders of the Syngman Rhee regime (1948–1960) and the short-lived Chang Myon (1960–1961) government. Park blamed the former for Japan’s colonization of Korea

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16 By 1980, Korea’s per capita income had risen to $4,300 from $79 in 1960; in 1995, Korea’s per capita income reached $10,190 (Joongang Ilbo, August 15, 1995:30–1).
17 We thank Choi Joo Ri, Department of English, Ewha Women’s University, for her translation of this poem.
and the latter two for the country’s chronic poverty and destruction after World War II. Allusions to a young girl “reading French poems” conveys Park’s disdain for these former leaders whom he accused of being more interested in an effete, foreign-worshipping lifestyle than in relieving the people’s hardship. Not only do these spoiled hands impoverish the nation, this poem suggests, they also exploit the Korean people. In stating that “tender hands are undesirable,” it implicitly justifies Park’s purge of all former officials.

But Park’s hypermasculinization of the state succeeded primarily because it resonated with traditional notions of Confucian manhood: that is, morality (do deok), strictness (eom), “face” (ye), and responsibility (chaekim) for household prosperity (cf. Lee, 1982). The Confucian emphasis on moral leadership justified the state’s political control over economic development. Manly strictness and “face”-saving legitimated state suppression of dissent to preserve dignity at home and abroad. Responsibility to the family is the father-husband state’s most important duty. Indeed, a tacit understanding binds superiors to subordinates under Confucian governance. Superiors enjoy all the rights and privileges that accrue to their station if and only if they can ensure their subordinates’ welfare. For the father-husband state, this means protecting and feeding the people. Thus the hypermasculinized state received a normative license to pursue economic development at all costs.

Society as Hyperfeminized Confucian Daughter-Wife

Hypermasculinizing the state entails hyperfeminizing society. That is, as the state shifts its identity from an internally oriented, managerial parent to externally pressured, competitive patriarch, it also transforms the role and status of society. No longer allowed to be childlike in its dependency, society, like the good Confucian daughter-wife, now has to undertake all the responsibilities and discipline of economic development.

To illustrate, we compare classical Confucian strictures for women with rationalizations presented by the Park regime for society’s role in Korea’s national reconstruction. We draw on two classical texts, Naehoon (Instructions for Women) and Samganghaengsildo (Principles of Behavior for the Three Bonds). Codified by Queen Han Sohyunwanghoo in 1475, Naehoon continues to serve as a moral and practical handbook for young women. The Samganghaengsildo institutionalizes this notion of governance as family relations writ large, with proper hierarchies between king-father-husband and subject-son-wife.

The Naehoon outlines “four responsibilities” for the proper Confucian woman. Womanly virtue, it instructs, means curbing one’s talents so that they do not outshine others (especially men). Womanly speech refrains from arguing or debating with others. Womanly appearance is understated and modest. And womanly work requires diligence without brilliance. For Korea’s hyperfeminized society of the 1960s–1970s, these strictures translate into: obedience to the state, discipline against dissent, and service to the economy.

Womanly Virtue: Obedience to the State. Confucian doctrine upholds womanly virtue as strict adherence to the concept of difference between men and women, masculinity and femininity, yang and yin. Recognizing and enforcing such differences guarantee harmony and prosperity under Heaven. “Maintaining differences between men and women,” claims the Naehoon, “ensures sincerity between husbands and wives. From this, fathers and sons will be close; kings and ministers will be

18 Although there are many modern editions of the Naehoon, it is not widely read in Korean society today. Nevertheless, the strictures cited in the Naehoon are popularly known and often given to young women as guides for behavior.
proper. As the ancients said: ‘The most fundamental of all rites is marriage.’ But these differences are not neutral. They reinforce the leadership, authority, and power of society’s superiors. Indeed, the Samganghaengsildo is filled with parables of virtuous subordinates (subjects, sons, wives) helping flawed superiors (rulers, fathers, husbands) return to their proper positions of authority in life.

Korea in the 1960s–1970s exemplified this subjugation of society to state through a functional differentiation between the two (cf. Jones and Sakong, 1980). State agencies formulated policy while social organizations implemented it. In the early 1960s, for example, the government established the Central Committee of the Cooperative Union of Small–Medium Sized Enterprises (joongsogieob hyupdolong jo-hapjunganghwai) to coordinate all export quotas with small–medium sized enterprises engaged in production for overseas markets. Under this agreement, the state allowed private consultation and even disagreement with enterprise managers through organizational intermediaries. But it did not tolerate public disputes on policy. Any organization—that sought to do so were swiftly and definitively punished. The Park regime established a national labor union, the Federation of Korea Trade Unions (FKTU), to “moderate union demands, implement government policy, and discipline recalcitrant locals” (Deyo, 1987:185). In 1971, the state prohibited any kind of labor dispute; by 1980, “labor-management councils” were mandated for all enterprises, effectively replacing all union activity (Kim, 1986:42). The state further expanded its reach by reframing management-labor relations as “the father-son relation in the family [and] not so-called ‘labour contracts’ ” (Kim, 1986:42). “Each of us,” Park declared in 1962, “will have to discard his selfishness and unite for the common good . . . [so that we may] liberate the people from poverty and establish a self-reliant economy” (Oliver, 1993:280). A decade later, Park institutionalized this message with the New Village or New Community Movement (saemaul undong). It called on the Korean people to work hard, value self-sacrifice, and remain intensely loyal to the government (Oliver, 1993). To do so, society had to fulfill the other three virtues of Confucian womanhood.

**Womanly Speech and Appearance: Discipline Against Dissent.** The *Naehoon* instructs that “women’s talk should be controlled and not released outside [the home].” It defines womanly speech as “carefully selecting one’s words, never speaking badly of others, thinking before speaking, and not making a pest of oneself.” Accordingly, “women need not have rhetorical talents but must avoid bad and offensive language and speak with restraint” (Deuchler, 1992:257). Womanly appearance complements womanly speech with an injunction for understatement and modesty. A woman must keep herself clean, fresh, pleasant, and appropriately dressed. A woman must not shame her family with sloth or carelessness.

For Korea’s CDS, both strictures on womanly speech and appearance stipulate against society embarrassing the patriarchal state with protests for individual rights and freedoms. Instead, society must remain politically clean (neutral), economically fresh (hardworking), ideologically pleasant (non-communist), and appropriately presentable (stable) to the international community, especially its investors. Here, we see an overlap between strictures against speech and appearance. For example, a radical nationalist group, the Patriotic National Salvation Youth Corps, abducted dissident Kim Dae Jung in 1973 from his self-exile in Japan. They did so to prevent him from further “betray[ing] his fatherland” by criticizing the state from overseas (*New York Times*, August 14, 1973).¹⁹

¹⁹ Many believe that the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was behind this group.
Additionally, Park (1969, 4:272) warned, society must not be misled by the “slanderous speech and conduct” of politicians and protesters. By inference, society must remain pure and chaste from smooth-talking, self-interested, power-mongering politicians or the passionate but empty gestures of student protestors. “Leaders of the Liberal Party (Second Republic, 1960–1961),” Park (1969, 1:239) accused, “have always had a disease of talking smoothly (beonjireireihan) but falling short on practice.” Similarly, students entertain a “dangerous optimism” that may “stir up political, social, and ideological instability, thereby provoking a wrong decision from the communist regime in the North” (Park, 1969, 1:235–6).

By hyperfeminizing society, Korea’s CDS rescripts the legitimacy of dissent. Under Confucian parental governance, society could use moral suasion to convey dissent. This usually takes the form of an appeal by children-subjects to their parent-officials for redress against state abuse. But under the CDS, the Confucian daughter-wife has no such option. The Naehoon identifies womanly speech in terms of conversation, not voice. Thus neither women nor the hyperfeminized society in the CDS can dissent publicly or formally.

Examples abound in Korea, especially in state responses to student protests during the 1960s–1970s. Aside from brutally executing dissenters,20 the state also imposed guidelines for a “self-control system” that prohibited by law any act that may jeopardize “national security,” “economic stability,” and/or “diplomatic matters” (New York Times, December 29, 1973:A2). State-sanctioned newspapers also editorialized that students should be blamed for transgressing their roles as dutiful children, and asked their families to punish them accordingly. These reactions may seem typical of any conservative regime to student-led protests. But they were reasoned in terms of the inappropriateness of student dissent especially given the Korean’s state’s structural precariousness: that is, the communist enemy to the north, the nation’s economic priorities, and even potential disdain from the international community. As one judge decreed upon students for the Dongeui University Incident of May 3, 1989: “Because the students refuse to act as students, we, the older generation must deal harshly with them. Otherwise, both society and state would meet with chaos and fall under control of communist power. We see here the legitimacy to punish the students harshly” (Chosun Ilbo, September 29, 1989:1).

Womanly Work: Service to the Economy. The Naehoon notes that “a wife’s role must be limited to helping the husband manage manly matters.” Otherwise, civilization would collapse if society allowed “a hen to crow.” To ensure against such chaos, the Naehoon specifies three duties for the proper Confucian daughter-wife. She must (1) serve her parents-in-law, (2) obey her husband, and (3) care for and advise her children. Even with her children, the proper Confucian wife-mother must maintain a hierarchy of care. The first son inherits the entire family estate; hence the virtuous Confucian mother spares no expense in nurturing and developing him until he reaches maturity. Subsequent sons support the family and its future patriarch: the first son. Daughters do not count since they “belong” to their husbands’ families once married. Until then, daughters provide free labor for the family.

In the Korean CDS, the hyperfeminized society performs all three duties by nurturing the growth of its socioeconomic first sons: corporations. Throughout the 1960s–1970s, the state subsidized Korea’s conglomerates, the chaebol, with society’s sacrifices: low wages, restrictive labor policies, low interest loans, tax incentives, favorable exchange rates, access to foreign borrowing, and the creation of special economic zones to entice foreign investment. In 1964, for example, the chaebol

20 Unofficial sources estimate that approximately 2,000 civilians were killed in the Kwangju Uprising of 1980.
received 43 percent of total circulating capital in Korea’s economy, and almost 15 percent of its foreign loans (Cho, 1994:176, 187). In 1973, the state set up a special government fund for the chaebol, allocating it 59 percent of total loan capital available that year (Cho, 1994:187). In the 1970s–1980s, the state helped the chaebol win lucrative contracts overseas, especially in the Middle East (Ling, 1984).

As heir to the family estate, so to speak, the chaebol basks in the protection of both state and society. In 1987, 68 percent of Koreans surveyed about the chaebol criticized it for enjoying unfair state subsidies, curbs on wages, tax avoidance, monopolies, or inflationary profits. Nevertheless, 84 percent of the same sample also felt that the chaebol had made a “real” to “fair” contribution to the national economy (Cho, 1994:305, 309). At the same time, the state does not hesitate to chastise the chaebol whenever it acts disrespectfully (cf. Nam, 1995).

This elevation of the chaebol displaces Korean society’s traditional first sons: university students. Historically regarded as society’s future leaders and visionaries, university students feel obligated to protest social injustices but now find themselves increasingly marginalized in Korea’s political landscape. For example, students harshly criticize the chaebol: “Let’s dismantle the comprador chaebol which fill their bellies by selling the nation”; “Tear down the swindling, thieving, monopolistic chaebol!” (Kang, 1993:381, 386). A student flyer from 1986 declares: “Our target is the comprador chaebol that exploits the masses’ labor while remaining blind to their avariciousness.” Upon graduation, though, these students invariably join ranks with the chaebol as executives, bankers, researchers, bureaucrats, and the like. This leads to an escalating sense of cynicism, alienation, and anomie among Korea’s young professionals.

Students also find themselves increasingly isolated because of their activism. Demonstrations at Yonsei University in August 1996 are a case in point. Disgusted with what they see as decadent materialism sweeping Korean society in the South, student agitators advocated North Korea’s ideology of “self-autonomy” (chooche sasang). But they alienated most of the public when their demonstrations seriously damaged some University buildings and a few police were killed during the confrontations. Many suspected the students of working as agents for North Korea.

Regardless of who the first or second son is, the CDS daughter—women workers—remains its most invisible, exploited member. Just as society nurtures the growth of the chaebol with its taxes and low wages, so it builds industrial strength on the backs of its women. Herein lies the dual nature of hyperfeminization in the CDS. Women, as the most feminized of the hyperfeminized, are subject to the greatest exploitation. Thoughout East Asia, economic growth relies on the low-wage, low-skill, but high-productivity of its women (Cook and Hayashi, 1980; Wong, 1981; Fujita, 1987; Kawashima, 1987; Cheng and Hsiung, 1992; Salaff, 1992; Brinton, 1993; Iwao, 1993). Mass assembly plants specifically recruit Asian women for their “nimble fingers” and “docile natures.” The Korean CDS institutionalizes this industrial strategy in elementary schoolbooks by identifying factory work with women; to the men belong more prestigious jobs such as president, politician, bureaucrat, judge, scholar, scientist, general, artist, and athlete (Kim, 1985:109).

Yet wage differentials between female and male workers in Korea remain substantial. According to Nam (1994), female workers earned about 44 percent of men’s

21 Approximately 80 percent of workers in Korea’s export industries (textiles, plywood, electronics) of the 1980s were young girls aged 16–23 (Kim, 1986:39).
wages in 1971 and 48 percent in 1985. This income gap has improved only slightly since then: in 1990, women’s wages accounted for approximately 79 percent of men’s in the service industries; 56 percent in clerical work; and 54 percent in manufacturing (Paik, 1993:71). Additionally, companies continue to exclude women from higher paying administrative or managerial jobs.

Women’s unions also face stricter state control than men’s, often encountering both physical and sexual violence. In 1974, only 18 percent of female-dominated industries such as textiles and clothing were unionized, compared to 37–50 percent in male-dominated industries (Ogle cited in Kim, 1986:42). Nam (1994) identifies two main reasons: women workers predominate in the export sector which is most regulated by the state; and women workers need collective bargaining to increase wages since men monopolize all other avenues of upward mobility (e.g., improved job skills, seniority, and promotion). Clearly, women workers do not count in the much-vaunted family model of Korean managerial relations.

Kim Chi Ha, a famous dissident poet, satirizes and laments this dual feminization of Korea under the CDS (Kirk, 1973):

And, when they [the bureaucrats] softly write,
"INCREASED PRODUCTION,
INCREASED EXPORT
and CONSTRUCTION”
on the mistresses’ breasts, the women murmur,
"Hee-hee-hee, don’t tickle me!”
Then they jokingly reproach,
“Say, you ignorant woman, do
national affairs
Make you laugh?”

The exploitation of Korea-as-woman spills over to foreign policy as well. As Moon (1997) shows, the Park regime openly utilized prostitution "camptowns" in the 1970s to dissuade the Carter administration from withdrawing U.S. military bases in Korea. Camptown prostitutes recall how local officials recast them as "patriots," "nationalists," and "servants of the nation" for providing sexual services to U.S. military men to entice them to stay in Korea.

In another poem, Kim Chi Ha analogizes Korea’s transition into modernity as a woman about to enter prostitution (Kirk, 1973):

Don’t cry, I am going.
Across the white passes,
through the black passes,
Along the wearily road to
Seoul, I am going
To sell my body.

Table 2 summarizes Korea’s hypermasculinized state and its hyperfeminized society, with their underlying gender associations.

Implications for Democratization

This analysis bears three implications for democratization in the CDS: (1) it needs substantive, not just procedural, democracy, (2) society can benefit from a maternalized discourse for social action, and (3) like CDS authoritarianism, strategies for democratization must be hybrid in nature.
Substantive Democracy

Procedural democracy focuses on the institutional infrastructure needed for political representation: laws, elections, abstract rights, and practices. Substantive democracy targets the power relations that inhere within such processes especially when expressed in those privatized, personal domains associated with family and home. Democratic theory usually assumes that procedural democracy leads to substantive democracy. We question this conflation of two, quite distinct, processes.

Take, for example, Korea’s recent campaign to eliminate government corruption. It has resulted in unprecedented prison terms for several former presidents and a death sentence for one, Chun Doo Hwan. The government charged Chun with “breaking the official chain of command,” “violating the constitutional order,” and “abusing political power” for his role in the Kwangju massacre of 1980 as well as illegal profiteering while in office. These acts are “anti-national and anti-historical”; according to the government, they leave an “irrecoverable scar” in the minds of the people (Chosun Ilbo, August 6, 1996:1). While this official censure is important for maintaining the rules of democratic governance, it does not address or redress the substantive origins of corruption in government. That is, what societal complicities allowed these abuses of governance to occur? How does “bad” government corruption differ from “good” economic development when both are contingent upon the patriarch-state accepting tribute from “wife”-society, “first-son” corporations, and “daughter”-workers?

Feminists spearhead this critique of procedural democratization especially in the East Asian CDS. Osawa (1993) echoes Fukui (1992) in demonstrating how Japan’s “corporate-centered society” offers yet another means of intertwining social with economic patriarchy. Similarly, Mikanagi (1995) asserts that Japan is “undemocratic” given its “political . . . constraints upon the lifestyle choices of women and men.” She refers to the political subversion and distortion of Japan’s Equal Employment Opportunity Law. Here, even the imperatives of modernization cannot provide substantive democratization given the highly gendered nature of the development process itself.

Table 2. Gendered Division of Labor Between State and Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypermasculinized State</th>
<th>Hyperfeminized Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Hard state”</td>
<td>Obedience to state orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerance of domestic dissent</td>
<td>State-managed economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insistence on respect at home and abroad</td>
<td>No public voicing of discontent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect and feed the people</td>
<td>Fulfill state’s developmental plans, nurture chaebol, sacrifice workers and women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confucian Manhood</th>
<th>Confucian Womanhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral leadership</td>
<td>Accepting husband-father dicta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social strictness</td>
<td>Refrain from argumentation or debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal dignity</td>
<td>Not shame one’s family with sloth or carelessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family responsibility</td>
<td>“Women’s work” obligations as daughter-in-law, wife, and mother</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Waylen (1994) calls for a broader definition of democracy that extends beyond an exclusive focus on “objective,” “neutral” institutions. She proposes a democratic theory that considers extant power relations in socioeconomic interaction as central to the formation of a democratic “public sphere.” Others challenge the gendered, racial, and classist underpinnings of Western liberal democracy as canon and as practice (Okin, 1987; Pateman, 1989; Young, 1990a, 1990b; Ferguson, 1991; Phillips, 1991, 1993; Willis, 1992; Jones, 1993; Eisenstein, 1994).

For the East Asian CDS, we suggest a maternalized discourse for social action as a first step in substantive democratic reform.

A Maternalized Discourse for Social Action

As this article shows, the CDS links state with economy with family. This embeddedness of CDS authoritarianism renders the dismantling of the patriarch-state neither feasible in the short run nor necessarily desirable given a world economy led by Western masculinist capitalism. After all, the CDS emerged in reaction to its feminization by the West. Rather, our alternative strategy seeks to mitigate unequal power relations between state and society, capital and labor, patriarchs and children, men and women by introducing an alternative discourse of negotiation. It acknowledges and is premised on the previous daughter-wife contributions of society for CDS development. But it elevates society’s status to a more mature, deserved status: the mother-matriarch.

This call for a maternalized discourse for dissent and activism differs from Ruddick’s (1995) notion of “maternal thinking.” Where Ruddick bases her concept of a maternalized ideology on the actual, practical work of mothering, our version of maternalized dissent reflects the rights, privileges, and authority that Confucian culture bestows upon mothers, particularly in light of its emphasis on filial piety. Normatively, therefore, she has a right to demand respect from her “superior,” the patriarch, and devotion from her “subordinates,” children. A Confucian mother-matriarch wields tremendous moral and economic influence in her household as well as general society. Her formal subordination to the husband-father figure belies an informal authority as the family matriarch and manager of household finances. Indeed, the Confucian mother-matriarch is not a chaste and innocent young maiden who needs to be protected from the “sleazy” and “corruptive” practices of the political/masculine public sphere. She is, instead, a figure of experience, wisdom, and authority. As Oliver (1993:75) notes, the role of women—and especially of mothers—was a “curious mixture” in the traditional Korean household:

Within the home, women exercised authority in all matters domestic, even over their husbands and sons. A wife was known as “the inside master,” just as her husband was “the outside master.” The family finances were managed by the women and, however meager these resources might be, the women were expected to stretch them to meet the family’s basic needs.

Most susceptible to this maternalized critique are those very “pillars” of corporatist CDS: state, capital, and the “monopolies of representation.” The state cannot dismiss a maternalized discourse of activism as adversarial, immature, or irrelevant—as it does by infantilizing student protests (Ling, 1994). Rather, the state must respond to a maternalized discourse with temperance and respect. Otherwise, the patriarch-state jeopardizes its own right to paternal authority and credibility. Neither can capital in the form of CDS first-sons, the chaebol, resist a maternalized discourse. A powerful rhetoric of filial responsibility by son-corporations to father-
state and mother-society could enable, for example, environmental safeguards against pollution, better welfare and wages for workers, and prohibitions against state-corporate collusion at the expense of society. The CDS “monopolies of representation” have a dual role here. As quasi-autonomous, semi-public organizations they occupy a “third realm” (Huang, 1993) that straddles both state and society. These organizations may view a maternalized critique as useful leverage against the power of the state. At the same time, this discourse renders them more sensitive to societal demands. In any case, this process cracks open the (in)famous insularity of the CDS bureaucracy. It provides dissidents and democrats with a new ally within the corporatist structure of the CDS.

Korean society has witnessed already the potential impact of a maternalized dissent. In December 1985, a group of women organized the “Family Association for the Achievement of Democratization” (minjoohasilcheon kajokwoongdong hyupenihoi) to protest the state’s forcible imprisonment of children or husbands for political reasons. As “mothers of the Korean people,” they marched to City Hall and shamed state officials for violating a sacred precept of Confucian governance: benevolence. Neither the state nor its police could take action against these protestors. After all, they were mothers exercising the full extent of their moral authority. Many believe that this movement was critical in facilitating a peaceful transfer of power from Chun Do Whan’s military dictatorship to Roh Tae Woo’s civilian government during the June Democratic Movement (yoowol minjoo hanjaeng) of 1987.

A maternalized discourse may mobilize social action at large as well. Instead of isolating the burden of dissent to one social group—that is, students—a maternalized discourse may help them along with women, workers, and other members of the community to realize their common feminization and exploitation by the state. This recognition opens new possibilities for linking “student protests” with “women’s issues” with “class politics” with “public dissent.” This is already happening to a certain extent in Korea. In a recent survey of twenty-something Koreans, almost 68 percent indicated their support for a new party, Alliance of Democratic Citizens (minjoosiminyunhap), based on a reorganization of civil institutions that would cut across established social, political, and economic divides (Joongang Ilbo, August 31, 1995:12). As these groups consolidate into a more inclusive social movement, the state cannot sustain for long a divide-and-rule tactic rationalized by “catch-up” developmentalism.

A maternalized discourse need not be limited to mothers or mothering. In challenging patriarchy’s one-sided depiction of women and femininity as negative, passive, silenced, and exploited, a maternalized discourse generates an alternative vision that is positive, active, articulate, and resourceful. It valorizes all women, including childless and young ones, by proclaiming a social and political gravitas for them that far exceeds conventional calculations of their worth in reproductive, entertainment, or labor terms. At the same time, a maternalized discourse preserves the importance of fatherhood and masculinity as a necessary, responsible partner to governance. In this way, men and masculinized subjects also have an incentive to support an activist, maternalized discourse for society.

**Hybrid Strategies**

Lastly, a maternalized discourse may tap into, draw on, and connect with social movements located elsewhere in the world community. We note earlier that a patriarchal state often sets up “mother-nation” as a nationalist ideal. This traps women and femininity into essentialized roles of subservience such as, for example, breeders for the state’s military (cf. Obbo, 1989; Anthias, 1989). But maternalized dissent may also invoke a rich, deep, and undeniable tradition of
compassion, responsibility, and generative growth. Koester (1995) notes, for example, the recent prominence of the Icelandic women’s political party, “The Women’s Alliance” (Kvennalistinn), due to such invocations. An activist, maternalized rhetoric also helped the Chipko women of India halt environmental devastation—their source of livelihood—for corporate development. And, like Korea’s “Family Association for the Achievement of Democratization,” the “Madwomen of Plaza de Mayo” (Las Locas de Plaza de Mayo) of Argentina ended the ruling regime’s “disappearance” of thousands of children, spouses, relatives, friends, and co-workers by utilizing a maternalized discourse of anger, horror, sorrow, and righteousness (Fisher, 1989). Along these lines, Elshtain (1992) calls for a “postsovereign politics” that obsolesces the notion of sacrifice for mother-country but retains its sense of responsibility to the community. What we suggest is a feminist retrieval of the power of maternal symbolism and rhetoric. Freed from the hegemonic grasp of the patriarch-state, maternalism and femininity may (re)vitalize powers and capacities previously denied, hidden, or distorted.

This brings us to a final point. Hybridity, as underscored in postcolonial theory, refers to an open-ended, non-ordered process of interaction. Any attempt to predict or control leads only to self-delusion if not self-defeat. Park Chung Hee may have articulated a hypermasculinized developmentalism to bridge Western masculinist capitalism with Confucian parental governance. But he did not instigate the process nor could he have predicted its specific institutional forms or socio-politico consequences. Similarly, our proposals of maternalized dissent and hybrid strategies serve only as instruments for change within CDS authoritarianism. They do not and cannot serve as organizing principles or institutional blueprints for a postcolonial-feminist version of “Asian-style democracy.” This very notion, as we point out above, stems from an orientalized Orientalism that postcolonialism explicitly repudiates. Our only resort is to learn, grow, and strategize across supposedly disparate communities to gain, just like authoritarianism, in hybrid strength and resilience.

Conclusion

This article debunks the Orientalist presumption of “East vs. West.” Our postcolonial-feminist approach shows that neither Western masculinist capitalism nor Confucian parental governance is essentialized, radicalized, or objectified. Korea’s postwar shift from a parent-child metaphor for state-society relations to a husband-wife one punctures the myth of a transcendent Confucianism as well as all-consuming capitalism. Indeed, both Western masculinist capitalism and Confucian parental governance exhibit remarkable flexibility, innovation, and resilience in face of new environmental demands. Just as Western masculinist capitalism adapts to the normative institutions of Confucian parental governance, so the latter also concedes to capitalism’s structural incentives and competitiveness. What results is a hypermasculinized developmentalism dictated by the state but accepted and supported by society—even at its own expense.

Our analysis exposes, as well, the misguided notion of “masculine West” and “feminine Asia.” Recognition of convergent patriarchies between East and West highlights the real targets of feminization: society, in general, and women, in particular. For this reason, we emphasize the necessity of substantive democratization in privatized power relations that emanate from the household, rather than limiting politics to those procedural, public domains already dominated by patriarchal interests. Our strategy of webbing disparate social movements motivated by a maternalized discourse of dissent aims also to mitigate, if not diminish, hypermasculinism in the world economy today.
We need to do so now more than ever. Many in today’s East Asia seem eager to emasculate the West just as it had done to them in the past. Some Japanese politicians refer to American workers as “lazy” and “unreliable.” Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s retired but still very influential senior statesman, characterizes the West as drug infested, racially divided, and spiritually deprived (Zakaria, 1994). Western countries counter with similar denunciations, threats, and ever-ready sanctions.

A hybrid, relational understanding of global affairs obsolesces these conventional Self-Other exclusions. It underscores the multiplicity of interests, concerns, practices, norms, and institutions that already constitute our world—and the responsibilities that result for us all.

References


Note, for example, the rise of a racialized/culturalized discourse of Asian triumphalism or “yellow mythologies” in East Asia (Berger, 1996).


